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ABSTRACT

This study researches the varying threats that emanate
from terrorists who carry their activity into the online

arena.

It examines several elements of this threat.

First, it explores elements of virtual to virtual attacks.
Second, it looks at threats against critical
infrastructures that can be traced to online sources.

Third, this thesis reports on ways that terrorists are

using information technology such as the Internet for
propaganda and communication purposes.

Finally, it

highlights the most crucial ways in which the United States
government has responded to the problem.

It concludes with

a few recommendations for best practices for future
engagement with varying aspects of cyberterrorism.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the post-modern era has brought with

it incredibly bounty.

Communication, facilitated by

technologies like the Internet, has reached nearly
instantaneous speeds - and this has positively impacted all

sectors of the economy, from health care to banking.
Arguably as a result of this technological mastery, post

industrial societies like that found in the United States
have been able to elevate their political, social and

economic position in the international community to
unprecedented heights.

But just as communication technology brings promise of

new hope for the present and future, it carries unforeseen
dangers.

Accessibility and convenience are easily

exploited by those with nefarious intent.

More menacing,

the sacrifice of traditional values and the marginalization

of social sectors that coincide with major societal shifts

create a class of disaffected peoples for whom hope lies

out of reach.

Often, the brightest glimmers shine from

extremist rhetoric, the devolution of which often leads to
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fatalist action.

Without other avenues of recourse, many

lend a hand to support terrorism.
Terrorism, then, has increasingly become one of the

gravest threats to the modern social order.

monolithic entity, however.

It is not a

The broader term "terrorism"

generally incorporates a variety of struggles, from
nationalist efforts to millennial, religion-based

ideologies.

Furthermore, many terrorist actions are often

confused with simple criminal acts, and distinguishing
between them is often difficult.

In order to proceed with

a discussion of terrorism, then, a few definitions are
required.

From these, one can derive a working version of

cyberterrorism, which will serve to facilitate the

discussion at hand.

Definitions

Any discussion of terrorism cannot be effective
without an initial definition of terms.

Neither the

international scholarly nor law enforcement communities
have ever reached a consensus on a definition of
"terrorism;" instead, agencies and scholarly journals use

the definition that best suits their needs.
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The United

States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example,
defines terrorism as

"...the unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
Government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives."1
There are several key components to this definition.

First, it requires that terrorism incorporate force or

violence.

Second, both persons and property can be

targeted.

Third, the goal of the attack must be to coerce

a government or society to adopt the perpetrator's
political goal.

This last component, in particular, is

often the cause of overlap between terrorism and less
threatening but equally potent political activism that

turns violent.

There is no contiguity in definition even among
branches of the U.S.'government.

In its 2003 Patterns of

Global Terrorism report, the U.S. State Department employs
the following definition, taken from Section 2656f(d) of

Title 22 of United States Code:
The term terrorism means premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience.2
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The primary difference between the State Department's

definition and the FBI's rests in the classification of the

actual attackers.

Other agencies, like the U.S. Department

of Defense, expand terrorism to include threats.3

Academia

suffers the same problem, with a wide range of definitions

obscuring any resolution or compromise.

In 2003, Ayla

Schbley attempted to resolve this debate with a rather

simple definition.

Terrorism, in Schbley's view, is simply

"any violent act upon symbolic civilians and their
properties."4
Such a definition may in fact be too simple, since it

avoids many of the specifics that delineate terrorism from

regular crime - most notably the political motivations
behind the actions.

So instead of attempting to reach a

clearly articulated definition, this paper merely
incorporates the components above into a loose meaning.
Terrorism, then, is motivated by political change, is often

attributed to non-state actors, and involves violence
against an individual, society, or property.

According to Mark Juergensmeyer, millennial terrorism,

such as the world is facing from groups like al-Qaeda,
seeks attacks that will result in the most destruction,

thereby creating the most press for them and their cause.5 A
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"computer bomb" is not as photogenic as its dynamite based

counterpart.

Computer based attacks are often not readily

noticeable; when they are, their complicated nature often
does not allow for newspaper-selling headlines.

Since it does not generate media coverage, there is an
implication that cyberterrorism is not a viable means of

attack for terrorists.
as violence.

First, it often is hard to classify

Even when targeted against critical

infrastructure, it often does not cause death.

As Chapter

Three will show, only one cyber-based attack has caused
widespread damage.

Second, and more important, many other

areas of cyberterrorism may remain in the area of activity
that seems innocuous.

For example, defacing a website is,

in many ways, akin to little more than graffiti on a

highway overpass.

It is often expressive, but is usually

cleaned up so quickly that it has little to no impact.
But perhaps this is ignoring a more important issue:

the intent of known terrorists.

Two tapes released by Al

Qaeda in 2002 - one featuring leader Osama bin Laden, the
other his right-hand man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri - called upon

their troops to attack Western economic targets.6

Although

consistent with Al Qaeda's grand strategy,1 this represents

5

a shift in tactics.

Cyberspace provides a unique avenue

for just such an attack, or the planning thereof.
One of the most prevalent definitions offered for

cyberterrorism comes from Pollitt:
"...cyber terrorism is the premeditated,
politically motivated attack against information,
computer systems, and data which result in
violence against noncombatant targets by sub
national groups and clandestine agents."8

This definition, like many others, only includes attacks.
It therefore excludes those who may be preparing for an

attack - a requirement for several techniques, including
Denial of Service.

Journalist Ann McFeatters addresses

this issue in a limited manner, claiming that
cyberterrorism is "...the intentional use of the computer

to cause panic by destabilizing the U.S. economy or playing
havoc with computer data systems."9

This definition, at

least, allows for vagueness - an important factor in a
situation that constantly evolves.

A loose definition seems appropriate here as well.

In

this text, cyberterrorism generally incorporates online

activity that seeks to promote the political causes or
ideology of conventional terrorism.

Individuals or groups

perpetrating these activities can be linked to terrorist

groups, but they are often merely sympathizers.
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Cyberterrorist activities as classified range from
propaganda to devastating attacks on critical

infrastructure; restricting the phenomenon to just a few
tactics, however, neglects its ability to take on new
forms.

At the same time, however, a loose definition such

as this allows the lines between terrorism and other, more
legitimate forms of speech to blur more easily.

This must

be taken into account whenever an action is deemed
terrorism.

A few other definitions are important.

Hacktivism is

hacking in the name of an activist cause.10

Hacktivism can

be found in the examples of the Zapatista movement in
Mexico11 and the online Hacktivismo community.12

Netwar is

an organizational structure in which the interconnectivity

of modern technology allows for less hierarchy.13

Denial of

Service (DoS) attacks are the attempt to neutralize a
network by flooding it with unnecessary information.
Further definitions can be found in Appendix A.

Literature Review

Scholarly attention to the problems of cyberterrorism
has been unnecessarily limited.

Many of the books and

articles produced have come from a few prominent computer
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scientists, although a limited number of political
scientists have addressed the issue as well.

Usually,

though, terrorist experts address cyberterrorism in
passing, as an emerging threat that needs to be addressed.

In many ways, this is a result of the youth of the threat

itself; computers and the Internet have only become
ubiquitous components in Western society in recent years.

By neglecting this threat, however, terrorism scholars have
allowed industry and media sources to set the tone.

Consequently, any cyberterrorism study has to answer to the
sensationalism raised by the media or security experts,
each of which stands to profit from increased attention to

the issue and could therefore be less than scrupulous in
their comments and predictions.

This study attempts to

overcome this scholarly deficiency and fill that gap.
Before delving into the specifics of the texts that
are available, though, a few statistics are required to

illustrate just how little research is available.

In late

April 2004, a study conducted against prominent scholarly
article databases found an incredibly low number of
articles dealing with cyberterrorism; similar queries of

media sources returned completely opposite results.
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The first study was conducted on EbscoHost, a
repository of over 3,500 peer-reviewed academic journals.14
A search for "cyberterrorism" on this database reported 18
hits - but many of these are from the same journal issue.

Five articles were printed in American Behavioral

Scientist's February 2002 issue, which was dedicated solely

to cyberterrorism.

Likewise, several articles produced by

this search came from the July 2002 issue of the

Information Management Journal; however, these articles

were all relatively short,

(one to two pages), and so they

were not of substantial length to provide a serious and indepth study.15

A similar search of academic database search

engine WilsonWeb produced only fifteen hits, whereas a
competitor, JStor, returned zero results.16

Opposingly,

news and media databases were rich with content.

The same

search on LexisNexis, a news database, only allows 125

results at a time; in this case, it maxed this allotment
out.17

Factiva, a similar system, has no such limitations

on its searches.

It found 1,236 articles on cyberterrorism

in the two years from April 2002 to April 2004.18

This problem is not limited to journals, however;
standard terrorism or national security books fared little
better.

A survey of 25 contemporary works on terrorist
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found that only five books listed cyberterrorism in their

index - and the most any of them dedicated to the topic was
six pages.19

Similarly, Jonathon White's beginner's guide

to terrorism only spent seven paragraphs on the issue.20

Obviously, little has been done in the scholarly
community to ensure that the issue of cyberterrorism has
been properly addressed.
there are no articles.

That does not mean, however, that

The few that do exist provide a

foundation, however weak, upon which this study has been

built.

These articles and books can generally be classified
into just a few categories.

Many, like James Ballard, et

al's "Technological Facilitation of Terrorism,"21 are aimed
at providing a comprehensive survey of the topic.

Some use

this general survey approach as a means to address a
specific facet of the problem.

Michael Whine's "Cyberspace

- A new Medium for Communication, Command and Control by

Extremists"22 uses this approach to describe the
communications component of cyberterrorism.

This works

both ways: Gary Bunt uses cyberterrorism to explore Islam's

presence online.23
Other issues are more specific.

For Dorothy Denning

and her peers, the free speech and civil rights abuses that
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can result from cyberterrorist crackdowns on non
cyberterrorists has caused her to pen several articles on

the difference between hacktivism, hackers, and

cyberterrorism.24

The broader umbrella of information

warfare is also used to address cyberterrorist issues,
although information warfare often is used in the context

of state military use against a foe.25

Networks and Netwars

approaches cyberterrorism as symbolic of an emerging
organizational structure.26

As a result of this relatively slim selection,
articles on cyberterrorism and the media have become
common.

Many reviewed found the media to be

misrepresentative of the problem.27

Finally, Yonah

Alexander and Michael Swetnam present an important edited

work that incorporates essays on cyberterrorism from
private industry, government officials, and legal and

academic scholars.28

Statement of the Problem

A modern terrorism text, like Rohan Gunaratna's Inside
Al Qaeda, addresses nearly every aspect of the threat.

In

his comprehensive research on the organization, Gunaratna
explores issues of their organization, structure, ideology,
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dispersion across the globe, strategy, mindset, and
resulting threat and requisite response.29

When addressing

any of the dozens of terrorist groups that have emerged in

the modern era, Walter Laqueur explores their motivations,

history, and actions.30

If this kind of attention is given

to conventional terrorism, then the same should be afforded
to its online counterpart.
Too often, the debate over the threat of
cyberterrorism revolves around critical infrastructure.

As

shown in Chapter Three, the question often seems to come

down to the effect of a cyberterrorist attack - if there is

a potential for death or destruction, it can count as
terrorism, if not, then the attack is something lesser.31
Yet if Western society is to truly understand

cyberterrorism, it must address all its forms, activities,
purposes, motivations, history and actors.

Neither the

journalistic nor scholarly literature adequately does so.
Because of this, mass media and culture are allowed to

set the tone of the social discussion on cyberterrorism.

This often leads to sensationalistic documents like Winn
Schwartau's Pearl Harbor Dot Com.

In this novel, the U.S.

is attacked by a wide, concerted electronic attack by

unknown sources.32

In 1991, Schwartau achieved limited
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notoriety by using the phrase "Electronic Pearl Harbor" to
describe the threat to cyberspace during testimony to the
House Committee on Science, Space and Technology.33

Similarly, an otherwise informative book on cyberterrorism

opened with an unlikely scenario in which cyberterrorists

cooperated with conventional terrorists to shut down a
large regional power grid, give the wrong medicine to

patients in hospitals, and otherwise cause havoc on
society.

Such sensationalism is damaging to a debate on
cyberterrorism for two reasons.

First, it incites fear

into those who are unable or unwilling to look into the
situation more thoroughly.

This can lead to unnecessarily

abusive legislation passed in the name of protection and
the general closure of social openness vis-a-vis the

Internet.

Second, this dialectic turns many who would

otherwise be worthy contributors to the debate away from

it.

It then becomes dominated by whomever can make the

most fear-inspiring claims.

Academia has a responsibility

to ensure this trend does not continue.
t~
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Purpose of the StudyGiven the statement of the problem, the purpose of

this study is to provide a straightforward and
comprehensive survey of the threat posed by this
phenomenon.

It recognizes that while a study of

cyberterrorism must not ignore motivations like ideology,

it is more critical to develop an analysis of the threats
posed by cyberterrorism.

This paper seeks to answer the

deficiencies of previous research, especially in
formulating a holistic theoretical approach to

cyberterrorism, and provide the analysis to do so.

By so

doing, this thesis will, advance the scholarly debate, which
inevitably impacts the law enforcement community.

Theoretical Basis and Organization
Since they are often designed to address a specific

aspect of cyberterrorism, many of the past studies have
been light on broad theory.

They are often designed to

address a specific aspect of cyberterrorism.

Franpois

Debrix, for example, explores the interactions between
cyberterrorism and the mass media.35

David Ronfeldt and

John Arquilla use cyberterrorism as an example of their

netwar theory.36
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Few works try to establish a model with which to
analyze cyberterrorism.
Islam in the Digital Age.

The closest appears in Bunt's

In this text, the author looks

at Islamic-based cyberterrorism from four viewpoints: the
theological support for online jihad, or "e-jihad;" varying
examples of hacking, cracking and hacktivist activities on

the Internet; extremist Islamic rhetoric on the Internet

after 9/11; and the association of the Palestinian/Israeli
conflict with online Islamic activity.37

His analytical model provides several important

points.

First, it looks at ideological justifications for

the activity.

Following this, the book provides examples

that illustrate exactly what activity is being highlighted.

Finally, it extends this illustration into the real world
by providing the context of two major and polarizing
battles: the 9/11 attacks and the Palestinian Intifada.

In

this manner, he has conceptualized the problem, described

its various implementations and actors, and provided
evidence of the correlation between the activity and the

real-world events that motivate the attackers.
While Bunt's model is helpful, it does not necessarily
apply to the expanse of threats contained in

cyberterrorism.

But this is because Bunt's text focuses on
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Islam, on the Internet, not cyberterrorism.

A

cyberterrorism paper would have to restructure Bunt's model

in order to be effective.
This thesis does just that.

First, it must remove the

aspects of Bunt's models that are too specific to an
examination of the Islamic Internet.

Those, of course, are

the in-depth explorations of ideology and real-world

linkage.

If cyberterrorism is a real and long-lasting

threat, it will not be limited to a specific ideology set
or sequence of events.

Nonetheless, these facets of

cyberterrorism, which essentially provide the individual or

group's motivations, cannot be completely neglected.

Instead, they must remain central to the analysis of a

specific individual or group.
Stripping out the causes will also allow for a more
careful analysis of the threat.

To this end, this paper

posits that there are four main threats or activities that
could constitute or support cyberterrorism.

Their

classification tends to rely on the means of action.
First, and most evident, cyberterrorism can occur in

the form of a virtual attack upon other virtual objects.
This primarily includes flooding and denial of service

attacks, but it can also incorporate web site defacements
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and computer intrusions.

Next in progression are virtual

attacks on real world institutions, most notably critical
infrastructures like electricity, water, and transportation

systems.

The last form of attack, which lies more within the
bounds of traditional terrorism, is the physical targeting

- that is, a bomb - of infrastructures critical to the
functioning of Internet systems.

address this topic, however.

This paper does not

First, the physical nature of

these attacks makes it difficult to distinguish them from
conventional attacks against other critical infrastructure
systems.

As such, this threat has been recognized before

in the literature on terrorism; some have even dubbed it
"technoterrorism."38 Second, the Internet was designed to be

resilient against attacks; traffic is automatically re
routed when traffic congestion occurs as a result of a

real-world emergency.

Although this strategy was tested by

the attacks on the World Trade Center and shown to be a

threat, the attack, which destroyed a major Internet
switching station, did not permanently knock out Internet
service.

For these reasons, this paper leaves this issue

to future research.
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The final and most important element of cyberterrorism

is the use of the Internet for information gathering and
communication.

Obviously, this does not constitute a

direct attack.

Often, this aspect is limited to the spread

of propaganda or as a collection site for individuals
supporting terrorist or cyberterrorist causes.
Nevertheless, these are important aspects to any terrorist

campaign, whether conventional or virtual.
The following chapters address these issues through

this model.

Chapter Two explores the possibilities and

challenges of virtual-to-virtual attacks; Chapter Three
similarly addresses attacks on real world critical
infrastructure.

Chapter Four examines the ways in which

the Internet can be used as an information-sharing and

communication device.

Chapter Five describes the U.S.

government's reactions to the cyberterrorist threat.

Finally, Chapter Six offers a summary of the arguments
presented herein and prescriptions for the future.

Methodology
Most research for this thesis was undertaken in a
standard manner, and drawn from familiar academic
resources.

Unfortunately, the dearth of texts on
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cyberterrorism (discussed in the Literature Review section

of this chapter), along with the delay for new texts to be

published, has forced the author to look to other avenues
for research.

News sources figure prominently into this,

as does primary research from websites.

These are

generally not taken as fact, but instead as an example of
rhetoric or activities taken.
Much of this research has been conducted over the
previous two years.

During this time, however, many

websites used as primary sources were taken offline, moved,

or were otherwise unreachable.

This included, especially,

extremist Islamic or terrorist-linked websites like
Azzam.com.

Since they were unreachable, verifying their

existence and their contents for this study threatened to
undermine it.

Fortunately, there are several services that archive
webpages.

Archive.org continuously scans the Internet for

site changes.

If the page encountered does not match the

page they have previously saved, Archive.org saves a new
copy of the website.

All saved copies are then available

for later review through their "Internet Archive Wayback

Machine."

The objective of this project is to ensure that
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the Internet's contents to not fall off the web as sites
change.39

Unfortunately, the Archive is not always reliable.
The servers often respond slowly or not at all.

In these

instances, the researcher can turn to Google.com..

In its

efforts to quickly search the web, it saves the most recent

copy of each website it visits.

Unless the site's owners

have asked Google to limit access to this copy, which
Google calls the cached copy, users can view it.40

This has

become a useful way to view the contents of a website that
has recently gone offline.
Several avenues were taken to find these websites.

Azzam.com was found through a 2002 USA Today news story by
Jack Kelley.41

Many were found via the database housed at

Internet Haganah.42

Since this lists not just the website

address, but its unique identifier and contact information

as well, it provides ready information for finding these
websites when they move.

The primary tool for this is

whois, which allows the user to search for detailed
information for each website, including contact and

technical information.
techniques.

Internet Haganah uses similar

Finally, some sites were initially found by

searching.for the online presence of terrorist groups found
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in the literature.

Al-Mujahiroun's website was located in

this manner.
Although the research for this project was primarilyconducted over the past two years, much of the background

knowledge required for its understanding is much older.

In

fact, the author has been active, often in a passive way,

in online communities for at least the past fifteen years.

Additionally, the author's conceptions of computer systems
were cemented in 2002 when he received a Bachelor of
Science in Computer Science.

Consequently, many parts of

this thesis, like the description of varying attack

techniques, were written from his understanding of the
situation and the technologies involved.

This paper was written, however, not for the computer

scientist but for the political scientist or policymaker.
Therefore, except where noted, much of the technical
information was summarized and explained in simple, non

computer terms.

When trying to explain these sections, the

author attempted to find academic sources that either
supported his definitions or expanded upon them.

Most of

these were acquired through the Association for Computer
Machinery (ACM)'s Digital Library.43
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To assist those not

familiar with computer and terrorism jargon, the author

included a definition of terms as Appendix A.

In essence, much of this paper was arrived at through
standard research techniques - exhaustive reviews of the
scholarly books and journals in university library

holdings, online databases like EBSCOHost and Lexis-Nexis,
and similar online sources.

The only exceptions were

listed above.

Limitations of the Study
Obviously, the absence of substantial previous
research presents a challenge'to this study.

At the same

time, though, it offers an opportunity for this study to
explore issues that may otherwise be ignored.

Instead, the

largest limitation for this survey is its lack of primary
research.

This deficiency is especially poignant in its

lack of research on the uniqueness of an individual or

group of cyberterrorists.

However, the author has no links

to such individuals, and no way to establish them, so that
research will have to be left to future studies.

This is

further stymied by the author's limited language skills,

which exclude the possibility of primary research from nonEnglish sources, particularly Arabic websites.

22

CHAPTER TWO

VIRTUAL-TO-VIRTUAL ATTACKS

Of the three forms of attack referred to above,

virtual attacks on virtual targets are the most prevalent.
Due to the technical nature of these attacks, however, they
often do not garner the level of press coverage that more

traditional attacks can - like the physical attacks on
critical infrastructure mentioned in the Introduction.

At

the same time, though, they are often easier to conduct

than more extensive attacks, like virtual attacks against
the same critical infrastructures (Chapter Three).

Virtual

attacks, then, should be distinguished as attacks through
the Internet (or a similar system) upon attacks that have

no real-world salience.

This compendium of attacks is by no means intended to
be all-inclusive.

One of the great failings of counter

cyberterrorism efforts is that there is no such compendium.

But to try to make up for this deficiency in this volume
would unnecessarily add to its length and detract from its
message.

The examples contained within this chapter, then,

are included simply to show the wide range of the threat.
In the following pages, the reader will find three main
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forms of attack under discussion: flooding or denial of
service attacks (which can be categorized together), worms
and viruses, and web site defacements.

These were chosen

as the simplest and most common examples.

Flooding and Denial of Service Attacks
The first recorded cyberterrorism attack was
perpetrated by sympathizers of Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers

terrorist organization.44

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil

EElam (LTTE), colloquially known as the Tamil Tigers, are a
nationalist terrorist organization that has been fighting

for the independence of ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka via

various means - from guerilla warfare to suicide bombing since 1970.45

In this instance, a splinter group that

called itself the Internet Black Tigers (the Black Tigers
are the commando branch of the LTTE) attacked Sri Lankan
embassies with a flood of e-mails.

Sent at a rate of about

800 per day for two weeks, the e-mails read, "We are the
Internet Black Tigers and we're doing this to disrupt your

communications."46

The continuous stream of e-mails choked

the bandwidth to and from e-mail servers, essentially

causing them to shut down.

Until they crashed, though,

worker's e-mail inboxes were filled with the unwanted
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messages, thereby obscuring their ability to recognize more
genuine communications.
This e-mail based attack did little damage.

Its

effects were relatively concentrated, applying only to Sri
Lankan government officials and those trying to communicate
with them.

Although it did cause certain Sri Lankan

government servers to shut down temporarily, the headache

was limited mostly to those in the computer support
services section of the Sri Lankan government.
That does not mean, however, that it had no effect.

Governments all across the world noticed the unique nature

of the activity, and assumed that it was a sign of an
emerging trend.

In the United States, for example, Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet notified

the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in June, 1998,
that such attacks could be replicated by terrorist or
conventional foes against the United States, specifically
naming Iran, Iraq and Libya as potential attack sources.47

The threat becomes more obvious and more worrisome
when one recognizes that these tactics are not limited

simply to attacks on e-mail servers.

Although usually not

sparked by political motives, there is considerable
precedent of this activity.

One of the most attention
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grabbing of these was a 2000 Distributed Denial of Service

(DoS) against numerous high-profile websites, including
internet web portal Yahoo.com.

On February 7, 2000, Yahoo's servers experienced an

overwhelming number of requests emanating from sources
across the Internet.

From 10:30 am Pacific Standard Time

(PST) to 1:00 pm PST, when activity was at its highest,
Yahoo's website received more than 1 gigabit of information

per second, an overwhelming number for their Internet
Service Provider.

The Yahoo website was quickly forced

offline until the company was able to move to a backup
location.48

The next day, CNN.com, a major news source,

experienced a similar attack; Dell.com, Amazon.com,
eBay.com and several others were also shut down.49

Denial of Service attacks such as these, which

essentially overwhelm the service provider such that they
are unable to continue providing service, are relatively
simple to orchestrate.

In a typical attack scheme, the

attacker first hacks into several computers across the
Internet and installs "agent" software.

The more computers

that the hacker can break into at this stage, the better;

they provide the soldiers in his or her digital army.

Once

satisfied, the hacker breaks into a few other computers and
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installs "handler" software.

These computers directly

control the agents, allowing the hacker to remain a step

removed from the process.

Once the hacker gives the

handler computers a few commands, generally little more
than the target address, the handler directs the agent
computers in the attack.

Each agent then routinely sends a

series of (usually invalid) requests to the target server,

though not enough that they will squelch the bandwidth of
the agent or seem unusual to a casual observer.

The target

computer, following protocol, responds with a simple
message saying that the message was received, thereby
doubling the amount of bandwidth used by the target

machine.

Such exchanges are fairly common, however, so it

is only when several agents coordinate their requests that
they have a noticeable impact on the target.50

As such, it is often difficult for the owner of an
agent computer to detect an attack, especially in a large
network.

Furthermore, determining the individual or group

behind the attack, which is obviously important for law

enforcement purposes, provides even more challenges.

Most

detection methods involve various means of traffic

monitoring, although alternative traceback methods are

often used to determine the hacker's identity.51
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Other

detection methods include "sniffers," which detect
suspicious activity on vulnerable computers, and processing
and network analysis tools that pinpoint load anomalies.52
The February 2000 attacks against CNN, Yahoo and
others were perpetrated by a Canadian teenage hacker known

as "Maf iaboy. "53

Mafiaboy was not driven by any political

motivation, so his attacks cannot be classified as

cyberterrorism.

But there are many other reasons for

including them in this compendium.

First, Mafiaboy's youth

provides important demographic information.

In a similar

attack, for example, an autistic British teenager crashed
the servers of the Port of Houston through a DoS attack,
effectively halting shipping until the systems were

restored.54

Second, Mafiaboy's attacks were relatively

unsophisticated, facilitated by tools easily accessible on
many hacking sites.55

Third, the effects of the attacks,

although minimal (Yahoo, for example, was online later the
same day),56 were limited by the technical resources of the

companies attacked. Potential cyberterrorists can employ
similar attack means and methods, but their targets are not
always so prominent.

28

One such example is the dual October 2003 DoS attacks
against the independent Internet Haganah organization.

Internet Haganah attempts "to make the Internet an
unfriendly environment for jihadists [sic]," according to
its owner, Aaron Weisburd.57

Mr. Weisburd targets websites

that he deems are connected to Islamic-based terrorist

organizations.

After gathering information on the owner of

the website and the company providing them with hosting
space(known as their hosting company), Weisburd publicly

pressures the hosting company to remove the questionable

content.58

Weisburd claims that he has shut down 42 0

websites in this manner.59
These efforts eventually resulted in blowback,
however.

On October 16, 2003, and then again on October

20, 2003, Internet Haganah was the subject of a DoS attack
that succeeded in knocking the website offline.

In so

doing, the attackers effectively shut down Internet

Haganah's hosting company, Hosting Matters.

The first

attack left Hosting Matters offline for nearly a full day,60
taking a number of prominent politically oriented websites,
message boards, and weblogs offline at the same time.
Commentators at some of the websites affected found message
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board discussions in Arabic and English alluding to further
DoS attacks on the organization.61

This was not an isolated incident.

In March, 2004,

the website for the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades, a secular
Palestinian nationalist group, reportedly called for a DoS

attack on the El Al Airlines website.

The message offered

training for anyone wishing to participate in the assault.62

Similar energy has been directed toward Internet attacks by

pro-Pakistani, pro-Palestinian, and many other groups.

These attacks have accelerated since the outbreak of the
Second Intifada in 2000, and, at least in the case of the
Israel-Palestine conflict, have been led by hackers from
both sides.63

Each side has.used several means of attack

uring that time:
"The most common weapons used were variations on
denial-of-service and 'ping-flood' type tools
with nefarious names like 'EvilPing,' and
'QuickFire.' EvilPing... can completely crash
most machines... Once one side distributes an
attack tool, that same tool is then reconfigured
and used against the [attacker]."64

The prevalence of such attacks is facilitated by a
variety of easy to use tools, EvilPing and QuickFire just

being two examples.

sophistication.

Evilping is an older tool that lacks

Some of the newest software, like

'Phatbot,' offers the user an almost completely automated
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DoS experience through the exploitation of advanced peer to
peer networking technology.65 Furthermore, these tools are
readily available, both on sites dedicated to hacking and

those dedicated to security.

They often come complete with

Hackerworld, for example,

instruction sets on use.

promises to teach the reader, "step by step, keystroke by

keystroke... exactly how us Hackers work our magic."66
Internet website 7hg reportedly combined hacking

information with extremist rhetoric, although its contents

could not be confirmed.67
Symptoms similar to those produced by such DoS
activity are often not directly connected to any particular
hacker or terrorist attacks.

Instead, they are often

little more than a by-product of events in the real world.
During the morning of September 11, 2001, for example, news

websites such as CNN.com and the Baltimore Sun were so

overwhelmed with legitimate traffic that they were unable

to serve all requests.

Even more innocent, interest in

National Security Agency (NSA) computer security guides

posted online crashed the NSA computers hosting them. 68

This phenomenon has been dubbed "slashdotting" or the
"Slashdot effect" after a popular internet news site whose

users unwittingly cause server meltdowns.69
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Both instances are side effects of legitimate use.

Consequently, they point to flaws in the implementation of
current infrastructure schemes that can be easily exploited

- namely, that the phenomenon of increased public interest
in an event serves only to stifle the ability to
disseminate information about the news story.

Left in the

dark, users tend to try to find information via any means
possible, thereby unwittingly widening the malaise.

It

would be unsurprising if would-be terrorists coordinated
any real-world terrorist attacks to coincide with similar
cyberterrorist efforts.

When aimed at news sources or

government agencies, these efforts could become a force

multiplier of the original attack.

Worms and Viruses
On November 2, 1988, the fledgling Internet slowed to

a crawl.

Three to ten percent of the computers online at

the time found their Internet connections disconnected as
the Internet's first major worm spread throughout the
network.

Though the number of infected computers was low

(about 2,000-6,000), the incident remains, proportionally,

the largest and most effective attack on the global network

since its inception.70

Nonetheless, the worm was written to
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be totally innocuous: the author, an MIT graduate student

named Robert Morris, merely desired to show the flaws in
sendmail, a popular mail program.71

Both the systems the

worm exploited and the resulting chaos and damage that
ensued foreshadowed later attacks.

While Morris's early worm was the most widespread, the
mantle of most damaging politically oriented malicious

software (malware) goes to the CodeRed series of worms.

Released on July 19, 2001,72 the worm first propagated
throughout the Internet by connecting to a randomly

generated set of computers and attempting to exploit a flaw
in the Windows operating system.

This behavior continued

from the 1st of the month until midnight on the 19th day of
the month, after which the worm launched a concerted DoS
attack on the U.S. White House website.

The worm was

programmed to renew this cycle at the beginning of each

month.73

In the process of shutting down the White House

website, the worm replaced the website of every 100th
Microsoft Windows NT server with a simple message that

stated that the machine had been "Hacked by Chinese."74
the time the worm was contained, it had caused USD$2.62

billion in damage.75
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By

Worms and viruses are a relatively similar phenomenon.
Both are designed to seize control of some aspect of a

computer's functionality.

Most, although not all, viruses

and worms have a malicious motivation, and often delete

files, corrupt the machine's operating system into an
unworking state, install a 'backdoor' to allow future
access, or otherwise wreak havoc on the system.75

Viruses

and worms differ from each other in that worms are designed
to be more automated, relying less on human input than
viruses.

They therefore tend to spread rapidly throughout

a network.77

Viruses, on the other hand., usually are

attached to a host program, and can only infect a computer

when the host program is run.78

Additionally, many worms,

like the most recent Netsky variant,79 initiate DoS attacks
after infection.

In many ways, therefore, worms represent

the greater threat.
Some of the most common worms of recent years have

spread through e-mail programs, wherein an effected machine
sends copies of the worm as e-mail attachments to everyone
in the user's address book.

Others, like Code Red or the

more recent Slammer worm, which attacked both computers and

ATM machines and had infected the majority of vulnerable
machines in just ten minutes, take advantage of software
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bugs.80

Many worms and viruses, including Code Red, exploit

vulnerabilities reported in computer security media. 81
Makers of the effected software often release a patch to

update the software before a malicious program can take
advantage of the vulnerability; in these instances, worms

spread by infecting machines whose owners have not updated
their software accordingly.
Both worms and viruses are often replicated,

reconfigured, and re-released.

The first instance of

CodeRed, for example, had a bug that limited the damage it

could cause.

Subsequent versions changed the intent of the

program, targeting different sites for DoS attacks or doing
something else entirely.

CodeRed II, itself a variant, has

been re-released in six different versions.82

The worm

spreading through the Internet at time of writing, Netsky,
had 2 6 variants.83

Often, the new variant of the virus is not authored by

the original programmer.

Instead, others download the

source code or otherwise copy the innovation to create
their own variation of the malware.

This applies to

hackers connected to terrorist organizations just as
equally as it does to less politically motivated hackers.
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In fact, this phenomenon has popped up with relative

frequency in cyberterrorist circles.

The Muslim Hackers

Club, which espouses pro-Palestinian and Pakistani

rhetoric, offers tutorials for would-be hackers on writing
new viruses or adapting old ones.84

Additionally, a variant

of the Toal virus that appeared in October 2001 (at the
beginning of the Afghanistan conflict) sends the infected
computer a randomly selected message.

Users with an

infected computer who open the e-mail that carries the

virus are greeted with messages as varied as "Usa against
geneva convention [sic]," "Is osama bin laden bad-loved ?

[sic]," and "Anthrax mail is true(not a joke)

[sic]."85

The

attachment, when run, distorts the screen image and pops a

similar anti-American message onto the screen.86

Similarly,

the Nedal virus, though relatively harmless, was so named

by the virus author because it is "Laden" spelled
backwards.

Nedal.a, a more effective variant, overwrites

popular file formats, including music and video files and
documents, and deletes all files on the computer on 11

September each year.87
In the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq, the reputed

author of the Nedal virus, a Malaysian hacker known as
Melhacker, threatened to "attack or launch [a] worm if
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America attacks Iraq."88

The worm he claimed to be ready to

release - early versions of which had reportedly already

appeared on the Internet - was a combination of several

earlier viruses and worms, including some attributed to the
same hacker.89

Although no subsequent worm was attributed to this

threat, it raised concerns over the phenomenon of viruses
as a cyberterrorism tool.

Through an accomplice, Melhacker

reportedly had ties to A.Q.T.E. Al Qaeda network,90 although
that group's actual ties to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda

are unknown, and presumed to be non-existent.91

Moreover,

several other viruses and worms emerged as. a result of the
Iraq War. The Ganda, Lisa and Wanor worms, which all

appeared near the beginning of the war, urged the infected
against the conflict.92

Accordingly, concerns over rising

pro-terrorist viral activity continue.

Web Site Defacement

Web site defacements are the most common, closest to

traditional hacking in method and means, and, in many ways,
the least threatening of the potentially cyberterrorist

activities addressed in this chapter.

Many consider them

to be nothing more than an annoyance that leaves little
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long-lasting effect. Regardless, they can be used by
cyberterrorists to limit the availability or content of
important information sources.
Defacements are usually relatively straightforward.

The potential hacker tunnels his or her way into a website
through any of a number of exploits and methods.

Some use

security holes in software or their configuration; others
use social engineering - the process of convincing a target

to unknowingly give up sensitive information about their
website93 - to gain access.

Once inside, the malicious

explorer replaces the website's content with their own.
In most cases, the new content holds little
information - usually just the hacker's name, group

affiliation, and 'shout-outs' to friends and colleagues.
Most individuals or groups that engage in these activities

target local sites.

Accordingly, Ion, a prominent

Brazilian group, targets mostly Brazilian sites;94 the

Italian group IR4Dex leaves their signature primarily on
Italian sites.95

Both these groups rank in the Top 10

attackers tracked by defacement monitoring website Zone-

H.org.95
Many are less innocent, however.

Unix Security Guards

(USG), a pro-Muslim hacking group that has performed 5069
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defacements, has emerged as a leader in the anti-American

web site defacement trend.97

The night after the start of

the war in Iraq, the group left hundreds of websites marred
with their own text.98

The text of a typical USG defacement

condemned the target, the United States, Israel, or any

group or individual deemed an enemy of Islam.

The

following is the text of the defacement of copts.org on 8

April 2004. Copts.org is a website designed to promote
awareness of abuses perpetrated by the Egyptian government

against its Coptic minority:

"well., that was for the shit u post in your
sites/forums/chatting rooms .. ur whole machine
is mine now... u punch of morons, u fucked
now..ha !?.

copts of usa/canada are punsh of real loosers,
all what u say about the persecutions in egypt is
bullshit ,
the same thing about the alleged
kidnapping of your girls ,
insulting islam all
over your websites doesn't help your case , its
just help us to learn how lame you are ,and how
gay is your demands... get the backup disks
readfy,coz u gonna have a long night lamers .. i
bit u will spend long days staring at your stupid
machine wondering how could i get in , and u wont
figure it out , so get the other -leet- asses
copts and u guyz figure it out together.

be happy , u have a clean HDs now.. plenty of
free space !, ayy khedma :0)
p/s stop your mean way of insulting islam/muslims
in your sites ... most of you grow up in muslim
neighborhoods , i don't think they were as
assholes to you as your are now , so have some
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respect to yourselves and to the others ...
just a thought.

its

cheeeeers to baasseem"

The text is revealing in a number of ways.

Besides the

obvious misspellings, swearing, and juvenile insults, it
reveals a narrow-minded commitment to the defense of a

cause - in this case, the defense of Muslims.

Furthermore,

although the attack and its rhetoric showed a focus on its

target, the resulting text indicates the lack of
sophistication such an attack requires.
USG was preceded by a number of like-minded groups,

all leaving their own trail of virtual graffiti.

Muslim

Hacker's Club (MHC), mentioned above in the viral section,
performed 28 defacements during November and December 2001

against mostly Indian targets.100

These attacks came at a

time when the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir was
devolving into violence; twelve died in December when the
Indian parliament was attacked by a group of terrorists.101

Another group, the World's Fantabulous Defacers (WFD),
has led more high profile attacks.

For example, the WFD

led an attack on Ariel Sharon's election website a week
before the 2001 Israeli election that elevated Sharon to

Prime Minister.

The initial reaction from the press

attributed the attack to HAMAS, indicating the potential
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link to terrorist groups.102

In its place, the group left

graphic photos and text that accused Sharon of being a war
criminal.

At the same time, it left a message expressing

the attackers' solidarity with Hezbollah and other fighters

in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Bosnia.103

In a number of texts, Dr. Denning has asserted that
this kind of behavior is "hacktivism," or hacking for an
activist cause, and not cyberterrorism.

Her justification

is that the attacks do not result in violence, "severe
economic hardship or sustained loss of power or water."104
This paper disagrees with her assessment.

Instead, it

posits that while such activity is, indeed hacktivism, it
bleeds into the terrorism category when the actions are in
support of terrorism or terrorist causes, as is the case
with MHC and WFD.

The potential effects of these attacks, especially
when coupled with more sophistication, could be

devastating.

Instead of completely defacing the website, a

potential cyberterrorist could replace the contents more
subtly.

For example, one of the many attacks on the

Recording Industry of America's (RIAA) website left the

site a parody of its former self.

Angered by the RIAA's

crackdown on music piracy, the hacker replaced several of
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its headlines with titles such as "Piracy can be beneficial
to the music industry" and "Are there subscription music
services up and running?"105

Similar attacks, especially if

timed to reflect real-world events like the WFD-Sharon
defacement, could spark the political change the attackers

On the other hand, if conducted in conjunction with

seek.

DoS, real-world or other attacks, such defacements could
set the tone of the information reported in a time of

crisis.

Conclusion

The three means of attack explored above - flooding,

viral, and defacement - are by no means representative of
all the virtual attacks available to the would-be

cyberterrorist.

Prominently missing are classical hacking

alternatives and goals, like intrusions into classified
systems. As a December 2001 attack on servers of the U.S.

General Accounting Office by members of the "Al-Qaeda
Muslim Alliance" shows, such attacks do occur, and can be

traced to terrorist-sympathizing hacker groups.106

Such

methods only augment the attacks discussed here.

These methods, and their supporting precedents, point

to a growing trend toward increased activity on the part of
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hackers supporting terrorist groups.

Moreover, the tools

that facilitate most of these attacks are both easy to use

and readily available.

As a result, the prevalence of this

illegal behavior will undoubtedly continue to rise.

Furthermore, world events, including major conflicts like

the one between Israel and Palestine, will probably
continue to cause spikes in activity.

When coupled with

anger over world events, the availability and ease of the
tools required for these attacks often serve to enfranchise

a class of people whose voices often get lost in the
shuffle of life.
Moreover, actively participating in the ideology in
this manner can reinforce its tenets.

Since many of these

hackers presumably - no studies on cyberterrorist
demographics currently exist - are not on the front lines

of the cause with a bomb and a gun, stories of the

activities of their ideological brethren can acquire a
heroic tenor.

This provides a fruitful recruiting ground

for terrorist organizations looking to diversify their

activity.
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CHAPTER THREE

THREATS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

When Dorothy Denning,107 Scott Berinato,108 Bruce
Schneier,109 and other scholars, journalists, and security

experts claim that there is little to no risk from
cyberterrorism, they draw their conclusions from the lack

of a risk they see emanating from critical infrastructure.
Their skepticism, though, is countered by the results of
numerous hearings, presidential directives, and at least

one breach of security.
The skeptics have a variety of points.

Schneier does

not believe that the general hacker ethic is not compatible
with terrorist ideology; he also claims that it will be

difficult for cyberterrorists to know which attack

strategies will have the greatest impact.110

Through

interviews with security representatives from the critical
infrastructure industry, Berinato attempts to show that the

threat of cyberterrorism has been neutralized through

effective security measures.111

Denning articulates that

although the threat from cyberterrorism is emerging, it is

currently not viable.112

These arguments have been

augmented by others who claim that the cyberterrorism
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threat has been overstated and overhyped by a mass media

eager for a sound bite and security experts trying to
increase their business.113

No one, they assert, has ever

been killed by a cyberterrorist attack.114

Indeed, many of these arguments carry salience.

The

youth of cyberterrorism scholarly research and the general

neglect of the trend by traditional terrorist experts have
allowed the debate on the topic to be dominated by the

media and security experts.

As Mark Pollitt wrote in a

paper for FBI Laboratory, cyberterrorism incorporates two
areas that people traditionally do not understand:

terrorism and information technology.115

As such, it is

easy for the media and security establishments to take

advantage of the situation.

In fact, a study on mass

media's coverage of cyberterrorism found that it was often

based on reports from earlier articles "with already

obscure sources;" employ a "sensationalist tone," including
the "spectacularly dominat[ing]" "use of negative words and

references to the magnitude of possible adverse actions;"
and legitimize their assertions through "official sources"

or security experts.116

On the other hand, a significant

number of the experts testifying at a 2002 House of

Representatives hearing on cyberterrorism were private
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security specialists.117

Such access to official debate

allows private industry to set the tone of a debate from
which they could profit.
Hyper-exaggeration does not negate the threat,

however.

Neglecting the threat of cyberterrorism on

critical infrastructure could become the catalyst that

enables an attack to succeed.

Although predicting the

course or success of an attack is a difficult endeavor,

this activity can be an important factor in protecting

critical infrastructure.

Several recent incidents have

shown that modern infrastructures may not be as prepared

against cyber-attacks as the optimists would like to think.
The first came in 1997.

Conducted over four days in

June 1997, Eligible Receiver was an exercise mandated by

the Joint Chief of Staff to target government websites
using readily available products.

Unclassified computers

from the National Military Command Center, the Pentagon,

U.S. Pacific Command, and many others were compromised, and
the attackers were able to deny services, change
information, and manage computer account information.118

Some reports have claimed that participants in the exercise

were able to gain access to the nation's power grid and

simulated'shutting down major portions of it.119
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The

Department of Defense confirmed that the nation's power

systems had indeed been compromised by Eligible Receiver,

but refused to detail the extent of the potential damage it
could have caused.120

The head of the Pentagon's Joint Task

Force on Computer Network Defense said that the operation
"clearly demonstrated [the] lack of preparation for a

coordinated cyber and physical attack on [the nation's]
critical military and civilian infrastructure."121
Subsequent attacks or exercises on U.S. infrastructure

or military systems have attempted to take advantage of
this vulnerability.

In 1998, for example, as the United

States was preparing for possible military operations
against Iraq, several Department of Defense computers were
compromised (through a known and resolvable vulnerability
in the Solaris operating system) in a coordinated attack

known as "Solar Sunrise."122

Once the computers were

compromised, the attackers explored the system, left
tracking software to gather information, and returned later

to retrieve their results.123

The sources of the attacks,

which appeared to emanate from the United Arab Emirates,
raised further concern.

In the end, though, no political

motivations were found - the systems were compromised by an
Israeli hacker and two California teenagers.124.
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Nonetheless, the attacks proved the limitations of the U.S.
government's cybersecurity, which could be just as easily

compromised by a group or individual with political
motivations.
Similarly, the 2002 Blue Cascades exercise, which

incorporated several Canadian and Pacific Northwest power
and other infrastructure companies as well as federal and

state agencies, explored the results of a potential
cyberterrorist attack or physical disaster.125

It found

that the involved parties generally had "at best a surface-

level understanding" of the threat, including "little
recognition of the overwhelming dependency upon IT-related
resources" for business operation and disaster recovery.126

Furthermore, there were little to no inter-agency or inter
governmental reporting system, public information channels,

or evidence preservation strategies.

The result was a

system ripe for exploitation by a cyberterrorist attack.

By neglecting the "human factor" of public information, the
infrastructure outages of the disaster could spur mass

panic and lead the public to believe the worst rumors.127
The 14 August 2003 power outage in the Northeastern
United States provides another interesting illustration.

Although the blackout was rooted in irresponsible overloads
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in the system,128 not terrorism, the initial reaction forced
U.S. President Bush to quickly release a statement assuring

the public that it "was not the work of terrorists."129

It

proved several vulnerabilities that terrorists can exploit,

however: the potential disaster when businesses in charge

of public utilities do not adhere to government
regulations,130 the interconnected nature of regional
infrastructures can lead to wide-ranging cuts in service,131

and the intrinsic role information technology plays in

critical infrastructure.132
Despite all these exercises and attacks, only one
successful incident of hacking a nation's infrastructure

has been proven.

Nevertheless, the case shows some

important vulnerabilities.

In March, 2001, an Australian hacker was convicted of
an earlier attack against his former employer, an
Australian sewer company.

After being passed over for a

promotion, the hacker broke into the computer systems that
controlled the sewage storage tanks and instructed them to

release their contents into the public waterways.133

Albeit

not a terrorist incident, it shows the potential threat
employees pose.

Since terrorists are not limited in their

location or employment, they can instigate cyberterrorist
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attacks on critical infrastructure through the inside

knowledge of an employee sympathetic to their cause.

Al-Muhajiroun provides an illustration of this.

The

London based Islamic group "swear[s] allegiance to Osama

bin Laden and his goal of toppling Western democracies to
establish an Islamic superstate under Shariah [sic] law."134
In a May 5, 2004 Press Release on the organization's

website, the group highlighted a demonstration they

organized that rejected democracy in favor of a Shari'ah
state and called for U.S. President Bush and U.K. Prime
Minister Blair to be tried under a Shari'ah court.135

The

last bullet in their Vision Statement is the

"establish[ment] of Al-Khilafah in order that Islam
dominates the World (Izhaar ud-Deen) and becomes the World

order [sic] . "13S

Reliable sources confirmed in 2002 that individuals
living in the United Kingdom and employed in the British
government's telecommunications sector have expressed their

support for extremist fighters such as those in Chechnya
and Afghanistan.

At least one of these sympathizers held a

degree in computer science from a British university.137
Although there is no confirmation that any of these
individuals are interested in disrupting Britain's
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telecommunications systems or providing others with the
expertise to do so, their proximity to crucial information

systems provides them the opportunity.
Likewise, it is not a huge stretch to subsume that

similar individuals hold similar positions in the utility

corporations of America's infrastructure.

Essentially, if

individuals connected to terrorists can allegedly enter
America's prison system as chaplains,138 what would stop
them from finding key positions in private infrastructure

providers?

This is certainly not without precedent.

Japan's Aum Shinrikyo excelled at bribing public officials
to gain access to public buildings, even after their deadly

Similarly, the Church of

attack on Tokyo's subways.139

Scientology's (which is obviously not a terrorist

organization)

successful infiltration of the U.S. legal

system while under investigation shows that such actions

are not necessarily fruitless.140

Consequently, it is not

unreasonable to expect that Al Qaeda may attempt the same.

Al-Qaeda itself has shown an interest in critical
infrastructure.

In 2001, city officials in Mountain View,

California - located in the heart of Silicon Valley, the

nation's technology hub - noticed increased website traffic

from Middle Eastern countries.
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Particularly, the webmaster

noticed that several revealing documents pertaining to the

city's standards vis-a-vis its police, fire, and utility
sectors had been downloaded.141

More menacing, a January

2002 National Infrastructure Protection Center Information
Bulletin reported that:

A computer that belonged to an individual with
indirect links to Osama bin Ladin contained
structural architecture computer programs that
suggested the individual was interested in
structural engineering as it related to dams and
other water-retaining structures. ... In
addition, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence
agencies have received indications that Al-Qa'ida
members have sought information on Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
available on multiple SCADA-related web sites.142

This computer, among others, was discovered in a house in

Pakistan that was reportedly "devoted solely" to
cyberterrorism training.143

SCADA offers a unique opportunity for the cyber
terrorist interested in critical infrastructure.

SCADA

networks provide remote access for control and data
acquisition of a variety of infrastructure control

equipment, from water pumps to traffic signals.144

These

are the networks that, according to Berinato, can be

controlled remotely in only limited ways.145
limited access can still be exploited.
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Nonetheless,

In general, the nation's critical infrastructure poses

a number of opportunities to the potential cyberterrorist.
Erbschloe identifies 51 key areas that cyberterrorists may

find to be attractive targets.

Prominent among these are

electric, gas and water systems; aircraft operations;
telecommunications infrastructure, including radio and
television networks and distribution systems;
transportation systems; and a number of others.146 Moreover,

a recent analysis of wireless communication networks, which

have been uses to control such systems as railroad

crossings, found a glaring security flaw.

Requiring

equipment found in any computer hardware store for less
than 1001 dollars, exploitation of the security gap can lead

to a complete jamming of the frequencies used by the

wireless network.147

Once discovered, the news of such

flaws often propagates quickly; the necessary patches to

negate their effects often cannot be implemented at the

same dispersion rate.
A compromise in infrastructure control systems such as
these, especially when controlled by remote access systems

like SCADA, can enable the shutdown of water, power, and
other utility systems.

Their interconnected nature allows

this to effect a broad segment of society, and spreads the
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effect through the entire region.

Moreover, this form of

cyberterrorism can increase the hysteria that can accompany

a traditional terrorist attack.

Therefore, whether

conducted via internal sources or solely from external

break-ins, the cyberterrorist threat to critical
infrastructure remains overwhelming; nonetheless, it is
probably not as apocalyptic as the sensationalist

descriptions prevalent in the media assert.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE INTERNET AS A COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE

The Internet has sparked a new communications era.
Family members can use its faculties to communicate,

virtually free of charge, across the world over chat
networks.

Multinational corporations can remain in

constant contact with their farthest flung offices through
e-mail.. The disaffected can raise awareness of their

plight via a simple webpage.

These uses of new technology are valid, and are
employed with a positive intent.

That does not mean,

however, that every human being with access to modern
technology will approach its use without any sense of

nefariousness.

Indeed, terrorists can use the

communications resources of the Information Age to promote

their cause and activities.

Chat rooms and websites are

especially viable means to promote awareness of terrorist
causes; in the hands of a marketing mind, they can attract

otherwise unreachable new recruits.

At the same time, the

anonymity of chat rooms and e-mail, especially when coupled
with obscuring methods like encryption and steganography,

can facilitate the planning of a terrorist attack.
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This chapter addresses this issue through the
exploration of these technologies.

First, it will provide

examples of who is online, and what has been done to limit

the effect of Internet-based terrorism.

Although the depth

of the Internet does not allow for truly authoritative

statistics, a few examples can indicate the dangers this

phenomenon presents.

The paper will then present a case

study of steganography, a method used to obscure data that

many fear Internet-based terrorists could exploit.

The growing ubiquity of the Internet provides a
fertile recruiting ground and communications channel for

the politically motivated of any vein.

Scholarly research

can not only recognize the threat this poses, it can and

should offer solutions to contain it.

Online Terror Groups
Almost all ideologies, from extremist Islamic groups

to far right hate groups, have established themselves
online.

They have accomplished this via both concerted and

individual methods.

Creating a website, for example, to

represent a particular terrorist organization would be a
concerted undertaking, whereas an individual website that

echoed the same rhetoric would have been established by
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individual efforts.

Either way, the effect is often the

same: the political message of the terrorist group is
spread.

The effectiveness of these tactics is facilitated by
the organizational structure of the organization.

Terror

groups that operate under a loosely knit organizational
scheme (as opposed to a strict, hierarchical one) are often
more able to take advantage of these technologies.

Arquilla and Ronfeldt described this phenomenon as netwar.
Essentially, netwar is the "use of networked forms of

organization, doctrine, strategy and technology attuned to

the Information Age."148

It is the adaptation of advanced

computer networking structures wherein no single leader or

communication path dictates the campaign or specifics of
individual actions.

Often, those involved are "dispersed

organizations, small groups, and individuals" who can be
separated geographically, culturally, or otherwise.149

In essence, the Internet and other telecommunications

technology bring people with a similar mindset yet diverse
locations to the same discussion and then empower them to

take an active role in furthering the cause.

Correspondingly, at least one study on persuasion has shown
that the typical message on many far right-wing message
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boards and websites is extraordinarily effective in
reinforcing a pre-existing ideology.150

It is even more

powerful if the end-user is able to directly interact with

his peers.

The result is that an "inverse relationship"

develops between a public's access to modern technology and
its government's ability to exert control.151
Consequently, Louis Beam, a leader of the American far

right, calls this phenomenon "leaderless resistance."152

The hate groups of the far right, both in the United States
and abroad, have been especially adept at adapting to new
technology.

In 1984, Beam created one of the first hate-

centered online Bulletin Board System (BBS).

In it, like

minded individuals could gather to discuss issues pertinent

to the BBS' "'pro-American, pro-white, anti-Communist"
theme.153

The advent of the Internet merely enabled hate

groups to spread their message; when it was confined to
BBS', the message base was limited by the technical

capacity of the BBS' equipment, specifically by the amount

of dial-up lines on which users can connect to the system.
The Internet's decentralized framework has no such

limitations.

As a result, the number of Internet outlets

for hate groups has exploded.

The newest edition of a

compendium of hate groups, for example, lists 113 pages of
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websites, chat groups, newsgroups, mailing lists and other

outlets that have emerged online.154
Of course, the harboring of hatred against another
group does not make someone a terrorist.

In fact, a public

debate still rages as to the necessity of differentiating

between hate crimes and more traditional incidents.155
Discussion of hate groups is included, however, because the
"us versus them" mentality that develops among their

denizens is reflected in the rhetoric of millennial
terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda.

Osama bin Laden's

rhetoric, for example, has often illustrated this trend.

Bin Laden routinely elevates the role of American power
until America becomes a "mythic monster" that "only divine

power can subdue."156

This effectively marginalizes any

role of compromise and polarizes supporters.

Moreover, the

rhetoric can have a powerful effect on an impressionable
viewer - like a curious website visitor.

Authors of extremist Islamic websites have adopted
much of this language.

In fact, many have been

particularly adept in using the rhetoric as a marketing
tool.

In a telling case, a Saudi born graduate student

residing in Idaho is, at the time of writing, currently

under trial for creating a website that allegedly promoted
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Islamic extremism.157

Similarly, the example of Azzam.com

provides a particularly telling illustration of this trend.

At the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks,
Azzam.com had already served as a mouthpiece for extremist

Islamic groups for several years.

Run by London-based

Azzam Publications, the website claimed to be little more
than a "media organization providing authentic news and

information about Jihad and the Foreign Mujahideen
everywhere."158 The website sold a variety of books, CD-

ROMS, and audio and video tapes on the subject.

Many, such

as the "Stories of Foreign Mujahideen killed in Bosnia"

series, glorified the tales of mujahideen (loosely
translated to be freedom fighters) fighting in various
conflicts involving Muslims, from Chechnya to Kashmir.159

As part of their reporting on these Conflicts,

Azzam.com also promoted tales of the mujahideen on their
website.

These narratives, often replete with obvious

hyperbole, glorified the efforts of the fighters
highlighted.

From a text eulogizing Saudi-born Abu Thabit

Ad-Daheishi:

i

I still remember the day you approached me,
venting your anger about the withdrawal of the
Mujahideen ahead of a Serb flanking manoeuvre in
Kosovo; you were angry and stressed that Jihad
demands steadfastness and sacrifice. I told
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myself, such words would only come from a man of
courage who would never withdraw from the face of
danger.
You made your way through the fields of
sacrifice, from Afghanistan to Bangladesh, to
Albania to Chechnya. You sought the glory of
martyrdom, and we ask Allah to grant martyrdom to
your noble spirit. Those who knew of Abu Thabit
would ask if he was still alive, for in him they
all had seen the signs of a martyr, and all knew
of his eagerness to fight and die for Allah...
Two weeks before you met your Creator, Sheikh Abu
Umar had a vision of you; in his dream he saw you
digging your grave with your own hands; Sheikh
Abu Umar interpreted this as the inevitability of
your martyrdom, so did another of your brothers
who had the same vision. ... During the
preparations for the assault, Abu Thabit raised
his hands in supplication to Allah. As he prayed
to his Lord, a missile exploded between Abu
Thabit and a brother Mujahid, Abdus-Samad of
Tajikistan, killing both of them.160
This language mirrors bin Laden's.

By promoting the

warrior role of the fighters, it glosses over details in

the ideology or the fighter's actions - like fighting in
the first place - that a reader might find questionable.
Furthermore, it conveys to the reader that they could gain

a sense of empowerment by volunteering for the cause.

This

helps overcome the sense of frustration and

disenfranchisement that characterizes many terrorists and
their recruits.161

Terrorists themselves are often either

"alienated from society" and/or "have a grievance or regard

themselves as victims of injustice."162
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Often, they are

most loyal to each other;163 websites that cater to them

consequently help these individuals find others like
themselves.

The contact often serves to reinforce the

sense of injustice.
Azzam.corn's story is particularly interesting.

In

July, 2002, USA Today journalist Jack Kelley reported that

the website was being used as a communications device by Al
Qaeda members planning their next move.

Messages between

terrorists, he claimed, were hidden in Azzam.corn's images

through a process known as steganography (steganography

will be examined in the next section).

Although the

reliability of the story was later thrown into doubt when
Kelley was proven to be a chronic fabricator and

plagiarist,164 the story resounded in several circles.
Politechbot.com, an online privacy website, challenged its
readers to try to determine the veracity of the story.165

They found several images that could contain hidden
messages, although the messages themselves were not
discerned.166
Azzam.com drew attention from other sources, however.

In particular, Jonathon Galt, a private citizen from the
United Kingdom, pressured the company hosting Azzam.com to

remove the questionable content.
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In order to elicit a

response, Mr. Galt sent the hosting company an e-mail

detailing the technical justification for his suspicions
and simultaneously threatened to take his claims to the

media and the U.S. government.
correspondence on his website.167

He then posted his

From that point,

Azzam.com moved servers several times, including to

entirely different domains like waaqiah.com.168

Eventually,

its owners gave up and closed the site down in a letter

that reiterated and highlighted the polarized mentality of

their rhetoric.169

Azzam's closure and Mr. Galt's efforts did not take

place in a vacuum; other websites and vigilantes replaced

them.

Whereas the number of extremist Islamic websites

(most of whose content remains in Arabic) has increased, a

majority of the pressure exerted upon extremist Islamic or
terrorist websites emanated from one group: Internet
Haganah (IH, originally introduced in Chapter Two).

The website, owned by American Aaron Weisburd,
I
routinely searches for websites that are either linked to
extremist Islamic groups or promote Islamic extremism.
Weisburd then posts a digital snapshot of the site, along
with the technical information for the site and the contact

information for the hosting company, on the IH site.
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A 2

May 2004 snapshot of the Internet Haganah website points to
several sites Weisburd claim are connected to HAMAS or

Palestinian Islamic Jihad or espouse extremist Islamic
rhetoric.170

Most of the websites to which Weisburd links

are written in Arabic, so their content cannot be verified
by this author, but Weisburd professes that he only targets

websites that espouse extremist rhetoric or are directly
linked to a terrorist organization.

When asked how he

makes the distinction, Weisburd responded:
"An 'Islamic' website that provides, for example,
support, encouragement or justifications for
political violence would be an extremist site.
An Islamic website that does not promote such
violence is not extremist. In practice, this is
easy. Osama Bin Laden [OBL] is not exactly the
Prince of Peace. When someone presents OBL as a
Great Man, they have gone over a line that should
not be gone over."171

By posting all the relevant information for each site

online, Weisburd is effectively calling upon his readers to
assist him in contacting the hosting companies, even though

he works closely with only a small group of individuals.172
By distributing the effort thusly, the effectiveness of

each individual website struggle is raised.

In effect,

Weisburd uses many of the same practices of online

terrorists and Islamic extremists to target them: he uses
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his website to promote his cause and simultaneously
empowers his readers to take matters into their own hands.

This is not the only similarity.

The intensity of the

rhetoric Weisburd - and, much more magnified, many of the

sites he approvingly links to - uses about Islamic

extremism is itself often extreme, or at the very least,
misrepresentative.

As an illustration, IH provides several

links to danielpipes.org, the website of a prominent, but
controversial173 commentator on Middle Eastern affairs.

The

website prominently and directly links to Daniel Pipes'

essay entitled "What is Jihad!" and several of its
translations, as if endorsing the essay as'a guide for
understanding jihad-based movements.

Pipes' essay runs into theological problems because it
ignores the mainstream Islamic perspective of the question,
focusing instead on extremist justifications.

Translated

literally, the term "jihad" means "struggle."

In

mainstream Islamic discourse, the term has two forms, the

greater and lesser jihad.

The greater jihad describes each

Muslim's inner struggle to find God; the lesser jihad is
the defense of Islam against its enemies.174

Pipes' essay

ascribes the greater jihad simply to mysticism so as to

focus on the lesser jihad.

He then exploits the definition
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of the lesser jihad, twisting it from a defensive to an
offensive term and justifying its translation to "holy

Twar
j-, . z/175
Another site to which Weisburd links often exhibits
schoolyard characteristics.

A typical day's lead news

stories cried "antisemitic [sic]"176 over some of Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah's statements, called a convicted
terrorist a "murderbot, "177 and implied that Islam was a
"religion of RPGs."178

Commentators on the website's

discussion board claimed Muslim protestors were part of a
"backward, Arab nazi movement [sic]"179 and hoped that one,
presumably an "Islamozoid"180 would "have an AK pointed in
that gaping sewer-hole of his in the near future."181
These issues are brought up not to discredit

Weisburd's work, or attribute the prejudices of others to
him.

Weisburd systematically points out each new iteration

of websites linked to HAMAS and other terrorist

organizations; in fact, he believes that their organization
and funding allow them to reappear more often than others.

In so doing, he provides an invaluable service to the law
enforcement community.

Additionally, Weisburd has said

that he takes pains to refrain from labeling the

proprietors of any individual as 'terrorist,' instead
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presenting the reader with information on the website and

its contents.

In this manner, he leaves judgment to the

reader.182
Instead, this issue has been raised to highlight the
prevalence of the polarization that can thrive in such

emotive, politically oriented online communities, where one
can 'speak' in an anonymous arena without immediate

retribution and have prejudicial speech reinforced and
cheered instead of castigated and discredited.

The tone of

such speech can quickly characterize the normal mode of

communication.

Doubtless, similar comments and situations

are as proliferate on many of the websites to which
Weisburd links, although language barriers, as mentioned

before, pose a limitation to this study.
No matter what 'side,' though, the standardization of
this type of rhetoric and misinformation - in the case of

the jihad essay - serves only to demonize the other in such
a manner that it becomes a monolithic enemy.

Even if not

directly linked to violence, it perpetuates the hostile
emotions of those involved.

Furthermore, since the public

nature of these sites, terrorist or otherwise, turns them

into propaganda outlets, it disseminates that hostility
into the rest of the Internet, and into society itself.
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Steganography: A Case Study183
Encryption is the process of changing the visible

appearance of a message in such a way that an observer

cannot understand it.

Encryption is obvious.

It puts a

lock on the data that the encryptor expects that only the

recipient of the message will be able to unlock.

It is

easy to discern an encrypted message from an unencrypted

one, because, as a rule, an encrypted message appears as

nothing more than random garble.

Once the lock is put on,

a key is required to view the unencrypted message.

Of

course, that lock can be picked, and breaking encryption
has become a cottage industry of its own.
In an encrypted message, however, the existence of the

message■itself is known to the intercepting party.
Steganography is essentially an attempt to halt this by
concealing the message in some other medium.

The idea is

not new. Ancient Greeks used wax covered tablets to conceal

messages: once the message was written, the tablet would be

sealed in wax and then transported to its destination with
the appearance of a clean slate.184

approaches appeared over time.

Other innovative

The Nazis developed an

approach in World War II called micro-dots - dots of ink
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the size of a period that contained a shrunken message.

Invisible inks were also prevalent during the period.185
Steganography does not have to be so complex.

A

previously determined steganographic method could, for
example, hide a message in the first letter of each word; a

phrase could mean something else entirely; or the
appearance of the cover message itself (for example, the

shape of the loop of a hand-written letter '1') could
contain'hidden meaning.

The problem with all of these

approaches, however, is that they can only be deemed secure

In1the interest of complete

until their use is discovered.

security, then, a new steganographic method has to be
devised for each subsequent message.

With the rise of computing technology, this is no
longer as necessary.

Although Jackson contends that there

is a constant "technological treadmill"185 being run by
those who want to hide data and those who want to find it;

in practicality, the cycle is not as rigid as the one time
system described above.

It is not that technology cannot

keep up: in reality, it can.

However, the sheer enormity

of the medium available (the entire Internet itself), along
with the margin of error in message discovery tools, can
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seem to give anyone trying to hide a message a tactical

edge.

Steganography in the computer age, then, has become
the art,of hiding messages inside media files, especially
image and audio files.

an embedded message.

The message being hidden is called
The medium hiding the message is

called a cover carrier or cover medium.

(In this study,

the two terms are used interchangeably.)

The resulting

message is a stego-message.

There are several pieces of

software available to assist in this.

One website lists 41

different programs for Windows alone, 31 of which are

completely free.187

Three of these were chosen for research

for this study based on availability, features, reputation

and the‘nature of the program's steganographic and

cryptographic algorithms.

The only common factor was

price: due to budget constraints, only software as freeware
was used.

Due to their vast availability, though, this

would do little to limit the variety of the survey.

In

addition, it must be stressed that this is only a survey.
This section does not endeavor to complete a comprehensive

view of steganography; rather, it is an attempt to
determine what a security response to the threat posed by

steganography should be.

As such, the demonstrations
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contained in the next few pages are simply that:

demonstrations.
'Regardless of the nature of the discussion, only
programs that divulged the nature of the algorithms used

were selected.

Fortunately, this does not limit as many

programs as it would seem: approaches to hiding information
in the most popular formats are generally well documented
(discussions of the formats used for this paper can be

found below), so it actually becomes more difficult to find
software that does not fit into any of these simple

paradigms.

A program's reputation was determined by entering the
name into the Google188 search engine. Google reports the

number of matching web sites, or hits.

This paradigm was

chosen because of the ranking system Google uses determines
a site's credibility by examining the number and quality of

sites linked to it.

Proceeding on the assumption that

"links are the currency of the web,"189 the most popular and
most credible search criteria will then return the highest
number of results, or hits.

Programs of various hit counts

were considered and included in this survey.

The features category was quite broad.

Under

consideration were the file types used as the cover
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carrier, the type of message allowed, the ease of use, and

the quality of encryption.

Cover carriers included various

image file formats, specifically JPG, GIF and BMP; and the

audio format MP3.

Software was also found that placed the

message at the end of any file.

The types of messages

allowed followed similar lines; they included all the image

types listed above, simple text messages, and the ability

to include the contents of any file.

Ease of use was

determined by screenshots and other material (directions,
feature lists, help files) found on the source websites.

Most programs listed their encryption method on the source
website as well.

The decision making process was

influenced by the same variable as the other categories;
variety being the key point of contention.
The final consideration before undertaking this
research was the carrier cover on which the embedded

message would be transmitted.

A decision was made early on

to only use images files; since the results would be
presented in a paper format, it was determined that audio

files would be too complicated or technical to present in

an understandable fashion.

The image was chosen from stock

photos available on the Internet.190

It was downloaded in

the Jpeg format, which was converted to bmp and gif.
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Before the conversion was attempted, though, steganalysis

was performed on the image (using the technique discussed

below) in order to protect against the ironic instance of
an image that is already a stego-image.

As a further

safeguard, the image was resized from 1152 x 830 pixels to
864 x 623 with MS Paint (included in MS Windows).

The first software tested was Hide & Seek.
it is a relic from another age.

DOS-only,

The intended cover carrier

must be a gif file; embedded messages must be plaintext.

It allows for encryption, but the version downloaded for
this paper did not come with the encryption package.

A

Google search for Hide & Seek was technically implausible
because of the common name: over 14,000 hits were returned,

and judging by the first page, few had anything to do with
steganography.

Use of the program was simple.

It asks for the cover

medium, the embedded message, and the stegokey.

A button

allows one to "hide" the text file; another allows one to
"seek" it.

The results were unimpressive.

The gif file

was already grainy from its conversion, but the resulting
image had an even more grainy appearance.

the image was resized to 1024 x 768 pixels.

On top of this,

However, the

image was not stretched to match the new size; instead, a
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black matte was placed on the bottom and right sides.

It

would appear that most of the message was placed in this

section of the image since the area is filled with tiny red
specks.

The file size increase was rather small, from 312

kilobytes (KB) to 351 KB, but it was greater than the text

file size (12 KB).

The beginning and resulting images can

be found in Appendix B.
Jsteg Shell, a Windows program, was chosen because of

the relatively high hit count returned by Google.

At 576,

it was the highest of any non-commercial program checked
against the search engine.

impressive.

This program was fairly

Selection of the cover medium and embedded

message were done through a "wizard:" a step-by-step, user-

friendly system.

It tells the user the amount of space

available for the embedded message, and will warn the user
if the selected file is too large.

It can hide files of

any type, so the embedded message could just as easily be

an executable file as a plaintext message.

Once hidden,

the resulting image appeared to be a reflection of the

starting image even though it hid an 11 KB document at the
expense of only a single kilobyte.
found in Appendix B.
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Both images can be

The final program selected for this survey was
Camouflage.

Camouflage integrates into Windows, showing up

when a user right clicks on a file.

A wizard gently guides

the user through the process of hiding the embedded
message.

Camouflage is unique because it allows any file

to be hidden in any other file.
adaptability comes at a cost.

Unfortunately, that
Its steganographic technique

does not obscure the message in the cover carrier; rather,

it places the'message at the end of the cover.

All files

have an end of file character that tells the computer when

to stop reading.

Camouflage merely places the message

after this character.

Detection, therefore, is fairly

straightforward; a search for files with this anomalous
pattern - and this search is quite common in virusdetection tools - is all that is really necessary.

Actually, detection (more legitimately referred to as

steganalysis) of any of these programs is rather
unremarkable.

There are several common, well-documented

approaches to steganography, and traditional steganalysis
simply looks for the tell-tale patterns of each.

Both Hide

& Seek and Jsteg are grandfathers of the genre; the

'readme' file of Hide & Seek traces versions back to 1996;

Jsteg, 1998.

The patterns of each, therefore, are widely
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disseminated.

Jsteg even includes a concise description of

the steganographic algorithm used.191

This paper will

examine the method used by Hide & Seek.

Hide & Seek uses gif files, and only gif files, as the

cover medium.

In the least technical terms possible, the

first part of any gif file is a 256-color palette, to which
each section (or pixel) of the image refers in order to
determine its color.

The values of this color palette are

represented as integers; on a common scale, a value of 0

means black and a value of 255 means white.
starts with 0 and ends with 255.)

(This palette

However, this scale can

slide: it could represent 256 shades of blue, for example.

It would be inaccurate to say that only one palette is used

per file; however, for the purpose of clarity, this
representation will suffice.192

Hide & Seek simply adjusts

the integers in these palettes so that they are each
divisible by 4, rounding any other values as appropriate.193

This results in a slight color shift. The white represented
by 255, for example, becomes 252: a shift of just over 1%.

One byte of the embedded message is then assigned to this

new value.

Since it is uncommon to find a 'naturally

occurring' palette (naturally occurring in this instance

means an untampered image) with these characteristics,
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detection of this manipulation becomes a simple examination
of the palette.
Since it is the easiest to implement, the method used
by Hide & Seek is one of the most common.

Unfortunately

for anyone trying to hide a message, that also makes it the
easiest to detect with steganalysis.

Manipulation of an

integer, or any other computer-represented value, is

nothing more than a shift of the binary representation of
For example, the integer 255

the integer (or other value).

is 11111111 in binary.
Before continuing, it is appropriate to explain a few

technical computer terms and methodologies.

Each of the

l's above is called a bit, and its value can be either 1 or
0.

Eight bits is called a byte.

Characters like 'a' or

'b' are generally represented by a single byte - so,

essentially, they are transformed into integers.

There are

common scales to determine the integer representation of a

character.

Modern personal computers ■■use the American

Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) chart.194
It is important, then, to note that to a computer,

'a' is

only one integer away from 'b' - and ,the value of two

colors on a palette are only a few integers away from each
other.

Even more important is the representation of these
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*1

integers.

If 11111111 represents 256, then 11111110

represents 255.

252 is 11111100 in binary.

The differences between these numbers are found in the

least significant bits (LSBs): the last bit in the byte.
The steganographic method used by Hide & Seek capitalizes

on this idea, and so do the steganalytic tools that are
(
designed to detect use of this type of algorithm. Whenever
non-random information is saved in a file, an analysis of

the file will discover patterns in the distribution of
bits, or bit patterns.

Since most pictures contain

information themselves - whether of a family portrait or a
nuclear silo - bit patterns will emerge naturally.

It is

easy to compare the patterns of a clean image and a

steganographic image if both are readily available.
Unfortunately, in the real world, most are not, so looking
for a known steganographic signature becomes the safest

attack.

StegDetect, a piece of public domain

steganalytical software written by Neil Provos, a doctoral

candidate in Computer Science at the University of
Michigan, is an example of this tactic.

It searches images

for the steganographic patterns of four steganographic

programs: Jsteg, the author's own Outguess, Jphide, and the
commercial program Invisible Secrets.195
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While this is appropriate for experimental software,

it is not conclusive enough to certify an image as message
free.

A better method is to second-guess the nature of the

embedding software by basing detection methods on the

statistical search for anomalies.

For example, it is easy

to estimate the distribution of colors in an image simply
by developing a histogram from the MSBs of each pixel in

the file.195

Another histogram, this time developed by

analyzing the full color depth of each pixel, is then

compared to the first computation.

Any sufficiently large

differences between the two would point to the possibility

of an embedded message.197

Unfortunately, testing for these

anomalies can lead to an unnecessarily large number of
false positives.

Even Provos, in a study of Internet

images with StegDetect -which, as noted above, does not use

this method - found what he concluded to be false
positives.198

Any steganalysis has to be cognizant of the

potential for these anomalies.

The security of steganography as a means of
communication has not yet been decided by the academic

community.

Many researchers have contended that the

science of steganography has not yet matured to the
security allowed by its cousin encryption,199 although a
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level of security is added by encrypting the embedded
message before it is placed in the cover carrier.

However,

the point of steganography is to communicate without the
knowledge of a third party.

N.J. Hopper contends in a

September 2002 paper that he has discovered a series of

stegonagraphic techniques that are provably secure.200

The

science of encryption has labored under this methodology of

theorize, disprove and theorize again since its inception;

the most recent example being distributed.net's crack of
RSA's RC5-64 encryption.201

The theories and practices of steganography are not
going away.

Methodologies and techniques are widely

available on the Internet, in scholarly journals and books,
and the minds of scholars worldwide.

Even if this were not

the case, the art of hiding information is not a completely
nefarious occupation.

It can be vital to corporate and

private interests for the same reasons that encryption is;
namely, that people deserve the right to keep secrets

protected from unwanted eyes.

In addition, steganography

can be used in the practical application of watermarking.
Copyright holders can use watermarks to protect their legal
holdings and prevent the illegal distribution or tampering

of these works.

The 'broadcast flag' that the Federal
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Communications Commission (FCC) is currently considering
for digital television broadcasts202 is just such an

example.
So any concerted defense against steganography should
not be so strong that it results in false positives or

intervenes in legitimate uses of the technology.

There has

been discussion of taking an active approach to

steganalysis: instead of merely listening to the data river

of the Internet, random noise can be inserted into pictures
to obscure or destroy any steganographic content.203

It has

also been suggested that steganalysis should become "a part

of every virus-detection software."204

While both can be

valid bulwarks of our cyber-defense, it is the first
suggestion, which is commonly referred to as an 'active

warden,' that contains the most potential in stopping the

spread of steganographic methods on the Internet.
Unfortunately, this also raises civil libertarian issues -

an unseen government with unfettered access to all Internet

communication - that may make an unmetered implementation
of this defense hard for the public at large to accept.

The experiences of Azzam.com bring to light several
concerns - especially when they are considered in an

environment where an active warden is present.
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Fisk

suggests that these wardens should be used in a firewall
like configuration to block and reconfigure any

steganographic messages.205

Firewalls block malicious

hackers from gaining access to a network, and can often be
used to block certain websites and other content.

Fisk's

active warden would not block any traffic, but instead add
noise to potentially steganographic traffic.

This noise

would have to remain in a precarious balance: it must not

degrade image quality so much that the end user can notice
the loss of quality, but it must add enough noise that any
embedded message is destroyed.

In order for this to be

effective on a national level, a series of these firewalls
must be placed on or near all of the major Internet

thoroughfares (the 'backbone' in computer terms).

This

centralizes the burden of detection and elimination of

steganographic threats.

Otherwise, the publisher of each

website would be responsible for keeping the contents steg

free.

This is the current system.

It is the shortcomings

of taking this approach that raise these concerns in the
first place.

In the case of Azzam.com, if the webmaster knew the

contents were secret al-Qaeda communications (and it was
proved that they were), and never did anything about it,
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that webmaster could be held liable under current legal

trends.206

What about eBay.com then?

eBay is a commercial

site with no proven links to any terrorist organizations.
There are thousands of active auctions on the site at any
given time, each of which could contain a number of images.

Would it then be eBay's responsibility to ensure there are

no malicious pictures?

Finally, what about the website in

the middle? This could be, for example, one with a forum
that allows users to post images in their messages.

These

are often run on shoestring budgets as a hobby of the
webmaster.

Would it still be the webmaster's

responsibility to remove any of these images?
would he or she obtain the resources to do so?

If so, how

Are we, as

a society, willing to allow the tradeoff of the loss of a

few 'hobby' websites for a supposed measure of increased
security?
These questions lead to a more centralized approach to

the problem of an active warden.
would be analyzed?

So, then, what content

It would be implausible for these

computers to filter every piece of a potential stegomedium.■ Instead, it is fair to assume that a 'blacklist'

of destination sources and destinations would be identified
and constantly updated so that the traffic coming in and
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out of each would get a clean bill of health.

Certainly, a

statistical approach designed to trace this information
would have to be taken because a known signature attack
would not necessarily return enough results.
decide what websites are on the blacklist?

But who is to

The reporting

of newspapers and websites is not sufficient evidence to
warrant the systematic tampering of a website's contents

and traffic.

Finally, an argument could be made that

tampering would be an infringement on the image producer's

right to free speech.

These are issues the nation will

have to deal with, especially as it adapts its laws to

reflect emerging technologies.

Conclusions

The Internet presents a new set of challenges for the

counter-terrorist officer simply because it allows for

greater communication capabilities.

Essentially, the

transnational nature of the Internet and similar

technologies facilitates the global spread of organizations

such as al-Qaeda.

Cell leaders (small, non-connected

groups of would-be terrorists that have reportedly been
established in most Western countries) can remain in
constant communication with their connections in al-Qaeda
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and other terrorist groups.

At the same time, the Internet

remains one of the easiest and most efficient direct
recruiting and communication channels of the disaffected

and disenfranchised.

Countering these developments is often futile.

Steganalysis, for example, is akin to a search for a needle

in a haystack - only in this case, the needle has been

disguised to look and feel like any other piece of straw.
Even when the rhetoric and communications are left in the

open, they are often difficult to counter.

Websites can be

established quickly and fleetingly, located in
disinterested countries or hosted by sympathetic companies,

and contain extremist rhetoric, commands, or
communications.
Moreover, many mediums, including chat rooms, are

unstable sources for the law enforcement official; the
information in chat rooms exists only for the moment at

which the conversation exists.

The software that runs chat

rooms, websites, et cetera, is readily available and
relatively easy to install for anyone with the relevant
background knowledge.

In these cases, terrorists can

simultaneously connect to a private, unadvertised server
for a short time, engage in their communication, and then
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Obviously, the temporary

never visit the server again.

nature of these practices enables terrorist activity to
remain under the radar, throwing up a significant roadblock
against counter-terrorist efforts.

Even websites that are more permanent, like Azzam.com
or its successors, tend to regenerate.

Since they are

intended more for propaganda purposes than communication,

the impetus to keep these websites alive is strong.
Whether through IH's efforts or otherwise, HAMAS's reputed
website, Palestine-Info, has been closed several times, but

that has not stopped its owners from simply moving to a
different server.

The dynamicism displayed by the tenacity of terrorists

to keep their online presence viable is symbolic of their

real-world tactics.

The long-term futility and endless

nature of counter-terrorism strategy, then, calls for a
different approach.

Ideology drives terrorists, keeping

the fervor to continue strong.

An effective counter

terrorism strategy, even one limited to cyberspace, cannot
focus simply on these back-and-forth tactics and ignore the

role of ideology.

Chapter six offers a few such

suggestions.

86

CHAPTER FIVE

GOVERNMENT REACTIONS

Western governments have not neglected the

cyberterrorism threat.

Indeed, since 1998, when U.S.

President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 63
(PDD-63) has, at varying levels, focused on the intricacies

of the threat.

A particular theme since this time has been

the integration of the public and private sectors in
addressing vulnerabilities.

This exploration of means to

counteract the threat were reinforced and addressed at more

length in the 2002 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,
the official U.S. policy paper on the matter.

The U.S. has not been alone in formulating policy and
legislation to protect cyberspace.

The European Union, in

particular, created the Convention on Cybercrime in 2001 to

deal with the problems of protecting cyberspace.

Although

it did not specifically deal with the threat from
cyberterrorism, it nevertheless established an inter

governmental framework for a criminal justice question that

transcends borders.

This, of course, can be problematic,

as the intergovernmental cooperation clauses could require

one state's definition of a terrorist to trump another's.207
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Nonetheless, it moves the debate into the realm of

international law.

President Bush has urged the Senate to

ratify the treaty.208

Several other nations have established legislation or
executive action to deal with cyberterrorism.

Their

numbers have mostly been limited, though, to states that
perceive it as a threat - a problem when dealing with a

security threat that can emanate from any state.

In 2000,

for example, the "I Love You," or "Love Bug" virus infected

more than 1.27 million computers, forced the U.S. State
Department to temporarily disconnect from the Internet, and

spawned several variants.209

Despite all this damage, the

suspected author, a Filipino man living in Manila, was
never convicted because the Philippines did not have any

laws against such actions.210
This illustration serves to underscore the importance

of international contiguity of legal codes dealing with
this issue.

The E.U.'s Convention, which was signed in

2001 by 30 countries including the United States, can help
serve this purpose, since it attempts to build an
international consensus in the approach to countering

cyberterrorism.211

The remainder of this chapter, however,

will be limited to exploring the U.S. government's reaction
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to the cyberthreat, focusing particularly on the National

Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and its criticisms.

U.S. Reactions

The U.S. government's first notable recognition of the
threat from cyberterrorism emerged from the 1997 report of

the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection.

The Commission determined that cyberthreats

took several forms: an attack on specific databases or
other information repositories; one geared simply toward

gaining network access; simple espionage; shutting a

particular service or sets of services down (particularly

via Denial of Service techniques); and the "introduction of

harmful instructions" - everything from viruses to
deliberate corruptions of data.212

The report sparked the 1998 Presidential Decision

Directive 63 (PDD-63).

The-document recognized seven

categories that made up critical infrastructure:
"telecommunications, energy, banking and finance,
transportation, water systems and emergency services, both

governmental and private."213

Equally important, PDD-63

sought a public-private partnership to determine the best
way to protect critical infrastructure, much of which was
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controlled by private institutions.

It conveyed the belief

that market forces should sufficiently pressure private

institutions into compliance with accepted best practices;

in so doing, the directive asserted that those charged with
protecting the nation's critical infrastructure should
"seek to avoid outcomes that increase government regulation

or expand unfunded government mandates to the private

sector."214

This idea continued as a trend in future policy

documents.
PDD-63 called for several other changes as well.

Most

prominent among these, the Directive called for the
establishment of a National Infrastructure Protection

Center (NIPC) and an Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ISAC).215

Three ISACs were eventually created,

serving the Financial Services, Telecommunications and
Information Technology sectors.216

The Information Technology ISAC (IT-ISAC) is the ISAC
most relevant to the discussion at hand.

Serving as a

trade association, its membership is restricted to U.S.
based "firm[s] or corporation [s]. "217

Despite this

limitation, its 24 members include several top security and
software companies like Microsoft, Symantec, and Oracle.218

Nonetheless, significant information technology sectors,
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particularly open source representatives, are notably

absent.' As such, the alerts the Center releases are

limited to problems with software from the companies

represented. 219
Part of the cause for this lies in the membership
restrictions.

Most open source software is not controlled

by a specific company; instead, volunteers develop the

product.

Accordingly, the software is usually free to

install, often leading to widespread use.

For example,

Netcraft, a company specializing in web site statistics,
found in a May 2004 survey that 66.99% of websites

(33,329,879 total sites) currently use the open source

Apache web server. 220

IT-ISAC's exclusion of this product

therefore limits its ability to provide an effective alert
system to the public.

Furthermore, since its membership is

based in the private sector, the entire alert system is

completely voluntary.

There is little impetus for firms to

not only release vulnerability alerts to the public, but

also share that information with competitors.
The NIPC, established under the FBI but now under the

Department of Homeland Security, provides weekly warnings
and emergency bulletins regarding cyberthreats.

Although

it still exists in a limited form, it was merged in 2003
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with several other agencies to create the United States

Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).

US-CERT

provides Alerts, Information Bulletins, and Tips to assist

the public in their efforts to protect their computer

systems.

The most recent weekly bulletin at the time of

writing, dated April 28, 2004, lists new vulnerabilities,
exploits and viruses in software systems discovered between
April 6 and April 26, 2004.

length.221

The document is 70 pages in

Obviously, this is an incredible amount of

information for the end user to wade through.

At the same

time, though, it shows the continued proliferation of
threats in cyberspace.
Released in February 2003, The National Strategy to

Secure Cyberspace updated the policies outlined in PDD-63.
Most importantly, it recognized that the effective defense

of cyberspace requires the cooperation and "coordinated and

focused effort" from "the federal government, state and
local governments, the private sector, and the American

people."222

Furthermore, it recognized that the challenge

is threefold: prevention of critical infrastructure from

cyber-based attacks, reduction in vulnerability, and the

absolute minimization of both the damage caused and the
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time required to recover.223

Finally, it recognized five

priority areas:
"I.A National Cyberspace Security Response
System;
II. A National Cyberspace Security Threat and
Vulnerability Reduction Program;
III. A National Cyberspace Security Awareness and
Training Program;
IV. Securing Government's Cyberspace; and
V. National Security and International Cyberspace
Security Cooperation."224

These three aspects - society wide involvement, focal
points and priority areas - provide a useful structure for

establishing a system wide cybersecurity strategy.

It

extends the public-private partnership paradigm to include
all sectors, recognizes the threats, and provides the

impetus for a centralized, system-wide information sharing
center that all Americans are aware of and use.

Unfortunately, some of the fundamental ideas built into the
structure, particularly in information dissemination and
standards compliance, limit its effectiveness.

Priority I, the Cyberspace Response System, looks to

establish a system that provides analysis and vulnerability
assessments, a warning and information network that
simultaneously provides a "synoptic view of the health of
cyberspace," and an incident management and recovery
system.225

Priority II recommends threat deterrence and
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reduction campaigns, including new law enforcement
techniques; the concerted recognition and neutralization of
existing threats; and the greater incorporation of security
concerns into new products.

Particularly, it looks to

improve both Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
Systems (SCADA) , which control critical infrastructure, and

the underlying technologies and physical components that

allow the Internet to function.

It also recognizes that

the threats and vulnerabilities to cyberspace constantly

evolve.226

The third priority seeks to establish an

extensive awareness campaign in the country, particularly
in large enterprises and home user sectors.

Its only

proposed method of addressing home users, however, is

through education at the primary, secondary, and higher
education levels; it ignores those not involved in the

nation's education system.227

The Strategy's efforts to secure the federal
government's information system, found in the fourth

priority, are among the most thorough recommendations
offered.

It addresses several components to this process,

including continued vulnerability and threat assessment,

especially on an agency specific basis; tight user
management; and special attention to ensuring that private
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contractors the government outsources projects to adopt

responsibly security strategies.

State and local

governments, on the other hand, are simply directed to work

with DHS to find solutions that fit their needs.228
Finally, the last priority seeks to strengthen law

enforcement coordination on cyberspace matters between U.S.
agencies and their counterparts worldwide, assisting

countries whose capabilities in this regard are
deficient.229

The release of the Strategy was greeted with criticism
from several corners of the computer security sector.
I

Most

of their complaints stemmed from the fact that the document

did not actually require anything of anyone - it only made
recommendations; particularly to the private sector, whose

cooperation was completely voluntary.
"lacked muscle."230

News.com said it

On the other hand, The Center for

Democracy and Technology, a think tank dedicated to privacy
and security issues, was concerned that the draft version

of the document did not do enough to protect online

privacy.231

Bruce Schneier of Counterpane Industries, a

prominent security firm, had a much more long-winded, but
still important, set of criticisms:
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"This National Strategy document isn't law, and
it doesn't contain any mandates to government
agencies. It has lots of recommendations. It has
all sorts of processes. It has yet another list
of suggested best practices. ... But plans, no
matter how detailed and how accurate they are,
don't secure anything; action does.
And consensus doesn't secure anything.
Preliminary drafts of the plan included strong
words about wireless insecurity, which were
removed because the wireless industry didn't want
to look bad for not doing anything about it.
Preliminary drafts included a suggestion that
ISPs provide all their users with personal
firewalls; that was taken out because ISPs didn't
want to look bad for not already doing something
like that.

And so on. This is what you get with a PR
document. You get lots of varying input from all
sorts of special interests, and you end up with a
document that offends no one because it demands
nothing.

...Security is a commons. Like air and water and
radio spectrum, any individual's use of it
affects us all. The way to prevent people from
abusing a commons is to regulate it. Companies
didn't stop dumping toxic wastes into rivers
because the government asked them nicely.
Companies stopped because the government made it
illegal to do so."232

Certainly, many of these, and other criticisms, 233 are
valid.

Their concerns may not have been addressed,

however, because of the difficulty of enforcement.

At the

user level, public understanding and awareness of computer
related issues remains low.

Much like an automobile or any

other technological tool, many end users simply expect
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their computer to function.

The inner workings of the

system do not enter into their daily life, so forcing them

to incorporate security concerns, even with the threat of
punishment, could stifle growth and/or lead to an
unnecessary overload in computer crime enforcement cases.

Mandates at the corporate level face similar

roadblocks.

Should a software firm, such as Microsoft,

face a punitive response if a heretofore unforeseen
security vulnerability is discovered in their products?
Likewise, mandates could open the door for litigation, both
against software creators and a compromised organization,

which could be sued by business partners concerned by their
security policies or by customers negatively affected by

the downtime.
Finally, there is an inherent problem in trying to

enforce legislation on an issue that constantly evolves.234

Bureaucratic and congressional inertia often delays law
making and enforcement activities.

Due to their dynamic

nature, attention to cybersecurity issues must remain fluid

to be effective.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to find evidence of the
effectiveness of the current voluntary strategy.

Although

the software of several firms was listed as compromised in
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the April 27, 2004 US-CERT Information Bulletin,235 as of
May, 2004, IT-ISAC's alert archive had not been updated

since January, 2004.236

Obviously, corporations are not

voluntarily divulging information that could negatively

impact their bottom line.

A compromise, then, would have

to find a path between absolute mandates and mere
encouragement.

Congress has provided a few alternatives that may be
helpful.

One of the most promising of these is the Cyber

Security Research and Development Act (H.R. 3395), which

was passed by Congress in 2002.

The law provides funding

for fellowships and research programs on cyber security

research. 237

The Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002,

which comprised Section 225 of the Homeland Security Act of
the same year, addressed cyberterrorism from a law
enforcement viewpoint.

It directs sentencing authorities

to account for the intentions of the attack, especially
whether or not human or public health was threatened, when

determining a guilty cyberterrorist's punishment.238

Congressional committees have also conducted several
hearings on cyberterrorism and the protection of critical
infrastructure systems.
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Conclusions
U.S. policy vis-a-vis cyberterrorism is still in its

infancy.

It has' not had the time required to develop into

a full-fledged policy set, especially in the prevention

It has, however, taken the first few steps toward

area.

that goal, particularly in The National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace's efforts to achieve ubiquitous online security

throughout all sectors.

The Strategy holds two key themes.

First, an

effective counter-cyberterrorism strategy must encompass
all of society.

Schneier is correct in his assertion that

online security represents a commons; this threat can be

best understood in the context of compromised agent

machines involved in a Denial of Service attack.
Similarly, the nation's Internet infrastructure is held in
private hands.

Protection of that infrastructure therefore

rests primarily on those entities.

Second, the Strategy recognizes that information
sharing and dissemination will remain key to any effective
policy.

This includes information collected before,

during, and after an attack, and requires the cooperation

of the public and private sector with an information
clearinghouse such as US-CERT.
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Information dissemination

is ineffective, however, without a public conscientious of
both the threat and vulnerabilities they face and an

information source for solutions.

The implementation of these policies does have
problems, however.

Most of these revolve around the weight

of the Strategy's recommendations, which require nothing

but voluntary cooperation of the involved sectors.
Mandating policy in such a dynamic environment is

problematic, of course, so an alternative approach needs to

be taken.

As time passes, however, workarounds to this

contradiction are likely to occur.

Like cyberterrorism

itself, cybersecurity is constantly evolving.

Given proper

attention, public policy will undoubtedly advance with it.
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CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS

"Not long ago, we marked the 20th anniversary of
a terrorist attack in Beirut, Lebanon, when the
suicide bomb truck attacked the Marine barracks.
And that blast killed more than 240 Americans.
Soon after that attack, President Reagan and
Secretary of State Shultz asked me to serve as
the Middle East envoy for a period. That
experience taught me lessons about the nature of
terrorism that are relevant today as we prosecute
the global war on terror. After the attack, one
seemingly logical response was to put a cement
barricade around the buildings to prevent more
truck bombings — a very logical thing to do. And
it had the effect of preventing more truck
bombings. But the terrorists very quickly figured
out how to get around those barricades, and they
began lobbing rocket-propelled grenades over the
cement barricades. And the reaction then was to
hunker down even more, and they started seeing
buildings along the Cornish that runs along the
sea in Beirut draped with metal wire mesh coming
down from several stories high so that when
rocket-propelled grenades hit the mesh, they
would bounce off, doing little damage. It worked,
again, but only briefly. And the terrorists again
adapted. They watched the comings and goings of
embassy personnel and began hitting soft targets.
They killed people on their way to and from work.
So for every defense, first barricades then wire
mesh, the terrorists moved to another avenue of
attack. One has to note that the terrorists had
learned important lessons: that terrorism is a
great equalizer, it’s a force multiplier, it’s
cheap, it's deniable, it yields substantial
results, it's low risk and it's often without
penalty. They had learned that a single attack by
influencing public opinion and morale can alter
the behavior of great nations..."239
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Unique among the mediums by which terrorists can

attack, cyberspace is characterized by a mindset that must
constantly evolve to survive.

This has been an intricate

part of cybersecurity since the first worm, the first

virus, the first hacking attempt.

When combined with the

ideological fervor that drives many terrorist
organizations, this sense of perpetual adaptability grows

stronger.
This thesis has shown, albeit in abbreviated form,

several of the current and potential approaches to

cyberterrorism.

This is nothing more than a snapshot of

past and present threats.

A new, heretofore unforeseen

approach or attack could emerge at the blink of an eye and

spread like wildfire throughout the hacking, cracking,
hacktivist, and cyberterrorist communities.

This

phenomenon becomes evident each time a new, quickly
spreading worm emerges.

Upon detection, cybersecurity

experts examine the intrusive software, determine a fix,
and then, once the fires have died down a bit, attempt to
find similar vulnerabilities that could be exploited.

do not expect their work to ever be fully completed, so
neither should a counter-cyberterrorist agent.
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They

Three areas of cyberterrorism have been addressed:

virtual attacks upon other virtual entities;

(1)

(2) virtual

attacks focused on physical critical infrastructure
systems; and (3) the use of the Internet as a

communications device.

The latter is not only the most

prevalent example of cyberterrorism, but the most dangerous

as well.

Even attacks on critical infrastructure, as

devastating as they could be, still are confined in scope.
Information on the Internet, on the other hand, is global.

It can be used as propaganda or to recruit new members.
Moreover, it can be employed as a communications medium
between disparate terrorist cells and their leadership.
This facilitates the global nature of modern terrorist

organizations, providing them with a greater means for
attack.

Accordingly, cybersecurity experts in

counterterrorist units must be allowed to address each of

these areas in order to fulfill their duties.
There are several ways to facilitate their work.

Like

the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, most of these
recommendations revolve around information sharing, both on

the database and awareness fronts.

An effective

implementation of these prescriptions would see them
realized, where appropriate, at all levels of an
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interconnected, global society - local, national, and

inter-governmental.

US-CERT's Information Bulletins have the potential to

efficiently distribute important information to protect the
public's online entities.

They could nonetheless use some

improvement in their ability to distribute the information

they contain, however.
In addition to the Bulletins and other alerts, US-CERT

should create a searchable database of vulnerabilities and
exploits.

This database should enable the end user to list

vulnerabilities by date recognized for a specific software

product.

By doing so, the database will enable the user to

ensure their software is completely up to date.

In fact, a

useful add-on to this database would be a piece of software
that scans a user's computer and, after connecting to the

database, presents the user with software patches and

updates that will protect their machine.

In addition,

software vendors should include a link to this database and
update software in their installation program.

Instead of

forcing the user to go to each software vendor for updates,
then, this centralizes and streamlines the process for the
end user and makes him or her more likely to take the steps
necessary to protect the machine.
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This idea is not without flaws, of course.

Privacy

issues spring foremost to the list of criticisms, as any
government-sponsored investigation of a user's hard drive

could be misused or viewed as suspicious.

may arise from the software industry.

Another problem

Understandably,

companies will not want to admit that their software could

be vulnerable to security issues, as that is tantamount to
admitting an inability to create secure software.

The lack

of timely alerts on IT-ISAC's websites indicates the
resistance of software companies to sharing this knowledge.

Furthermore, software vendors will probably express concern
over giving up control over their products to a third

party.

Nonetheless, these issues can be expressed through

a careful and concerted campaign.
The public will also stand to benefit from a more

effective awareness campaign than the one outlined in The
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.

The Strategy's

campaign is limited to business and educational

institutions.

Awareness programs should also target home

users, especially since the increasing prevalence of
broadband connections increases the pool of machines

available to serve as agents in a denial of service attack.

Advertising campaigns may work for this; more effective,
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though, representatives of US-CERT should make themselves

available to the media whenever an attack occurs or a major
new virus or worm hits the Internet.

If the media looks to

US-CERT for guidance at such times, the public will
probably follow.
Cyberterrorism experts should also seek to create a

database that tracks cyberterrorist activity.

The RAND-

MIPT Terrorism Incident database provides a useful model

for this.

It allows a user to search for information on

terror attacks by group, target, weapon used, region,
country, and city. 240

Updated regularly, the database

should track all cyberspace attacks in which law
enforcement officials believe cyberterrorism was involved.

Moreover, it should consider a number of variables,
including the type of attack, source, tools used (and
whether they seemed to be publicly available or homegrown),

probability of repetition, and rationale for classifying it

as terrorism.

Even if law enforcement officials later

rescind this categorization (which should be in the

database as well), an entry for the attack should remain so
as to facilitate a better understanding of law
enforcement's relationship to the threat.

Further analysis

can determine flaws in the law enforcement system or
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legislation that can be corrected to help assist later

inquiries.
Finally, every counter-cyberterrorism effort should be

undertaken with an eye toward two facets: cooperation with
other states and inter-governmental agencies, and the

motivations behind the attacks.

This comprehensive

understanding and approach will facilitate a quicker

response to the threat, and an ability to predict the
sources, methods and motivations of future attacks or

activities.
Cyberterrorism is a global problem; it requires a

global solution.

Its low entry cost makes it the most

equalizing attack method or force multiplier available to
many actors.

As a result, cyberterrorist threats will only

continue to grow.

To protect themselves, states, along

with the scholars that research the topic, must not only
heighten their awareness of the threats, but take steps to

counter them as well.

Serious problems from cyberterrorism

may not arise immediately, but they will eventually.

Without proper attention and precautionary steps taken now,

those problems will become catastrophes.
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Terms

Bit - The smallest piece of information a computer can

store.

A bit can either have the value 'O' or '1.'

Byte - A string of eight bits.

One byte usually stores one

character, such as a number or letter.

Critical Infrastructure - The infrastructure systems that
allow modern society to function.

These include

electricity, water, transportation, and

telecommunications equipment and stations.

Cyberterrorism - A loose definition is used in this text.

Generally, it refers to online activity used to
promote the political causes of terrorists.

Cyberterrorist - An individual or group that engages in

cyberterrorism.

Denial of Service (DoS) Attack - An attempt to neutralize a
network by flooding it with unnecessary information.

Hacktivist - Hacker who uses his or her skills to further

an activist cause.

Jihad - Literally, jihad means "struggle" in Arabic.

In

the context of mainstream Islamic discourse, there are
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two forms of jihad.

The Greater Jihad refers to the

internal struggle between a person and God; the Lesser
Jihad is the defense of Islam.

Load anomaly - Occurs when an unusual amount of resources
are used without an apparent cause.

Applies to

networks and processors.

Mujahideen - Warriors fighting to defend Islam.

Netwar - An organizational structure, especially attuned to

the Information Age and asymmetrical warfare, in which
the interconnectivity of modern technology allows for
less hierarchy and more adaptability.

Steganalysis - The process of analyzing a file to determine
if it holds a steganographic message.

Steganographic Message - A message hidden using

steganography.

Steganography - Hidden messages in Greek, steganography is

the act of hiding a message inside an innocuous
container.

In the computer world, this often refers

to attempts to hide information within image files.
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Terrorism - An ill-defined term, in this text, terrorism is

motivated by political change, is often attributed to

non-state actors, and involves violence against an
individual, society, or property.

Virus - A software program designed to gain ungranted

access to a computer.

Viruses often produce malicious

results, including deleted or corrupt files.

They

require some form of user interaction to attack.

Worms - A worm is basically a self-replicating virus.

When

connected to a network, many worms can spread across

the Internet in a matter of minutes.

Ill

Agencies

D.H.S. - Department of Homeland Security.
F.B.I. - Federal Bureau of Investigation.

IT-ISAC - Information Technology Information Sharing and
Analysis Center.

N.I.P.C. - National Infrastructure Protection Center.
US-CERT - United States Computer Emergency Response Team
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